Fordham Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 5

Article 9

2003

Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play
Sean J. Griffith

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1899 (2003).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

DEAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS IN THE
LAST PERIOD OF PLAY
Sean J. Griffith*
ABSTRACT
The ability to protect mergers is important to both targets and
acquirors. A series of recent Chancery Court decisions, however,
challenges the validity of deal protection provisions in merger
agreements and threatens the stability of Delaware's established
change of control paradigm. This article argues that last period
concerns animate the Chancery Court's decisions and finds, in the
last period problem, a theoretical principle capable of harmonizing
these decisions with existing jurisprudence and providing a coherent
approach to the practical problems raised by deal protection
provisions.
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INTRODUCTION

Deals, like most things in this world, fall apart.'
A number of events can disrupt a merger. The business of either
party to the deal may suddenly change for the worse. Stock market
gyrations may erode the value of the merger consideration. Swings in
interest rates may render financing unattainable. And intervening

bidders may arise to challenge the intended deal with a premium bid.
Merger agreements are vulnerable to outside interference during
the interim period between the signing of the merger agreement and

the closing of the deal.2 During this time, third party bidders may

make a premium offer for the target conditioned on the cancellation
of the existing merger agreement. From the target shareholders'
perspective this may hardly seem like a problem. After all, more
money is always better than less, and premium offers mean more
money for target shareholders. However, both targets and acquirors
may have legitimate reasons for seeking to minimize outside
interference in their merger plans. Most obviously, the acquiror will
have significant sunk costs in the initial transaction, including the fees

of legal and financial advisors, loan commitments, research and
diligence costs, and perhaps most significantly, management time and
foregone business opportunities.3 As a result, acquirors will insist that
targets commit to closing the deals they have signed.4 In addition,
targets have reasons of their own for avoiding non-binding merger
agreements.
A particular merger may present unique business
1. W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming (1922) ("Things fall apart; the center cannot
hold.").
2. The delay between the signing and closing of a merger is caused by the need
to obtain regulatory approval and shareholder consent. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(2002). The process for receiving shareholder consent includes, for public companies,
the preparation of a proxy statement and the solicitation of proxies in compliance
with the federal securities laws, and the holding of a shareholder meeting. Because
the process is likely to be much less burdensome for private companies, this article
focuses on mergers involving large public companies.
3. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1178 (1981)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role] (noting the extensive sunk
costs incurred by would-be acquirors in identifying and approaching target
companies).
4. If acquirors cannot get such a commitment, they are likely on the whole to bid
less for target companies. Each acquiror will withhold its reservation value for a
target on the chance that another bidder will emerge and force up the price in an
auction contest. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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opportunities or "synergies" for the target that an intervening
financial bidder cannot match. Moreover, if an initial acquiror can
easily back out of a signed deal, the target may be left "in play"
without a suitable buyer.' When a target's business is in such an
unstable position, its customers and creditors may be reluctant to
enter long term contracts for fear that the contracts will soon be taken
over by a buyer that they do not know and do not trust. Worse,
negative market reactions to failed deals may pressure targets to
abandon long term strategies in hopes of finding a buyer to replace
the initial acquiror.6
Although there is relatively little that the parties to a merger
agreement can do to protect themselves from fluctuations in the
business cycle or financial markets,7 the threat of hostile interference
with a merger agreement can be minimized through the use of deal
protection provisions. These provisions are designed generally to
immunize the transaction from the interference of unsolicited bidders.
More specifically, deal protection provisions may include terms that
prevent the target from soliciting the interest of other prospective
bidders ("no-shop" provisions),' or from negotiating with other
bidders once approached ("no-talk" provisions).9
Other deal
5. A target company is considered to be "in play" when it is known to be
considering acquisition proposals. The announcement of a deal places a price tag on
the target company, opening it to rival bidders and offering competitors a window on
the health of the target's business.
6. Market pressure may be a result of suspicions that the initial deal fell apart
due to weaknesses in the target's businesses, prompting target shareholders to sell,
and rendering the target still more vulnerable to an acquiror hunting for bargains.
7. Protection against these events usually comes in the form of an exit right, or
"out," from the merger contract. Material Adverse Effect clauses offer an out for
merger parties if the business of one party turns for the worse. See, e.g., In re IBP,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (providing a close judicial reading of
a material adverse effect clause). Collars provide an out if the value of the merger
consideration drops below a certain level. And financing covenants typically offer an
out if an acquiror, having exercised some level of effort, is unable to secure financing
for the deal.
8. The following example is derived from a public company merger agreement:
"The Target shall not.., solicit, initiate or encourage (including by way of furnishing
information), or take any other action designed to facilitate, any Alternative
Transaction ....
Panel on Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U.
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 219, 286 (Appendix F) (2002) [hereinafter Negotiating
Acquisitions].
9. The following no-talk example contains a "fiduciary out" (in italics):
The Target shall not ... participate in any negotiations or discussions
regarding any Alternative Transaction; provided, however, that if, at any
time prior to the adoption of this Agreement by the stockholders of the
Target, the Board of Directors of the Target determines in good faith, based
on advice from outside counsel, that the failure to provide such information
or participate in such negotiations or discussions would result in the breach
of the fiduciary duties of the Board of Directors of the Target to the Target's
stockholders under applicable law, then the Target may... furnish
information with respect to the Target and its subsidiaries ... pursuant to a
customary confidentiality agreement containing terms no less restrictive
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protection provisions may prevent termination of the merger
agreement until a specified date,"' trigger payments of cash or stock to
the jilted acquiror upon termination of the merger agreement," or
grant the merger partner a low-cost option2 to acquire the target's
prized assets if the agreement is terminated.
A package of deal protection provisions insulates the original
than the terms of the confidentiality agreement entered into between the
Target and the Acquiror ...and ... participate in discussions regarding such
proposal.
Id.On fiduciary outs generally, see infra note 14.
10. The failed First Union/Wachovia merger contained a non-termination
provision that was invalidated by the North Carolina Business Court. See First Union
Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, $ 166 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Aug. 10,
2001), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions (invalidating the nontermination provision).
II. For example: "Termination Fee Payable by Target after Triggering Event or
Competing Bid. If ...this Agreement is terminated ... [due to withdrawal of
support by target board], then the Target shall pay to the Acquiror, in cash ... an
amount equal to [4% of the aggregate transaction value]." Negotiating Acquisitions,
supra note 8, at 298 (appendix J) (emphasis omitted). The limits of termination fees
are debatable. Delaware courts customarily accept fees in the range of 3-4% of deal
value and have gone as high as 5%. See, e.g., Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC
Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280 (Del. Ch. 1998) (approving a termination fee at
approximately 5% of deal value). However, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Minerals Co., the court stated that 6.3% may be excessive. See Nos. 17398, 17383,
17427, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999). See generally John
C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory
and Evidence, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307 (2000); Jonathan T. Wachtel, Comment, Breaking
Up Is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell Atlantic and the Controversy over
Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 Brooklyn L. Rev. 585 (999).
Cross-options, for example, options granted on 19.9% of the merger partner's stockalthough originally granted as "pooling killers" to defeat a subsequent acquiror's
attempt to use now defunct "pooling-of-interest" accounting-can also be seen as
termination fees, increasing the cost of a subsequent acquisition. See Business
Combinations, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1970) (stating the rules for "pooling of interests" accounting).
12. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
178, 183 (Del. 1986) (noting the grant to Revlon's "white knight" acquiror of an
option to purchase Revlon's Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions
for "some $100-$175 million below the value ascribed to them" if another acquiror
succeeded in purchasing 40% of Revlon).
In addition, covenants requiring the target board to recommend the
agreement to their shareholders also have served to protect the original deal.
However, as a result of the 1998 amendments to Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL") § 251, which enabled boards to submit merger agreements to a
shareholder vote with a negative recommendation, submit-to-vote covenants no
longer have the same protective effect, and courts are unlikely to hold boards to a
promise not to change their recommendation since such a promise disables the board
from disclosing its actual views to shareholders and, therefore, managing the
corporation in their best interests. See generally John F. Johnston, A Rubeophobic
Delaware Counsel Marks Up Fiduciary-Out Forms (pts. 1 & 2), Insights, Oct. 1999, at
2, Insights, Feb. 2000, at 16 (2000) (discussing the fiduciary out provisions in a typical
merger agreement and arguing that the appropriate time to consider fiduciary
obligations is, with respect to most deal protections,t the time of signing, but with
respect to recommendation covenants, at the time the recommendation is issued).
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merger agreement from hostile interference by raising the risk and
cost of competing bids. No-talk provisions, for example, prevent the
target company from furnishing prospective bidders with diligence
information, making any subsequent bid a much greater financial risk
for a would-be acquiror. Similarly, termination fees will preclude
prospective bidders who value a deal with the target at a marginal
amount less than the cost of the fees that must be paid in connection
with the termination of the original agreement. 13 While none of these
provisions may completely foreclose the possibility of an intervening
bid, a package of strong deal protection provisions-including, for
example, a high termination fee and no-talk and no-shop provisions
without fiduciary outs 4-may well have the practical effect of
winnowing the field of potential bidders to zero.
Recently, deal protection provisions have excited controversy in the
Delaware courts,15 suggesting perhaps that complete insulation from
unwanted bids, even in the context of a friendly merger, 6 is
unacceptable. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet
spoken authoritatively to the issue, 7 the Delaware Court of Chancery
13. If, for example, the original transaction has a market value of $100 million and
a 5% termination fee, a prospective bidder who values the target at $104.5 million will
not bid. Bidders will only emerge (and the return to shareholders will only improve)
if they value the target at an amount greater than $105 million.
14. A fiduciary exception or "out" permits a board of directors to get out of a
particular contract term or an entire agreement if it determines in good faith that it
cannot comply with the contract consistent with its fiduciary duties. See generally
William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an
Anomalous Concept, 55 Bus. Law. 653 (2000). For an example of a fiduciary out
provision, see supra note 9.
15. Delaware law is the focus of this paper because Delaware is the state of
incorporation of the vast majority of America's most significant corporations and
because its corporation law is followed by many other states. See generally Leo Herzel
& Laura D. Richman, Forward to R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The
Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations F-1 (Supp. 2001) (noting
that over 40% of NYSE listed companies and over 80% of the public Fortune 500
companies that have re-incorporated have migrated to Delaware). That is not to say,
of course, that Delaware is the only state that has produced decisions with respect to
deal protection provisions. Other states have developed approaches to these issues at
either end of the deference-strictness spectrum. California, for example, permits
boards to foreswear third party bids during the period between signing and closing.
See Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 (9th Cir. 1984).
Nebraska, by contrast, seems to require an exit right for target boards in the event
that they are approached with a superior offer. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382
N.W.2d 576, 587 (Neb. 1986).
16. "Friendly" acquisitions involve negotiations between the boards of the target
and the acquiror. By contrast, in "hostile" acquisitions the acquiror bypasses the
target board and seeks to secure control of the company by appealing directly,
whether by tender offer or proxy solicitation, to the target shareholders. The
functional differences are that in a hostile acquisition, unlike a friendly acquisition, it
is possible to gain control of the target without the consent of the target board and
management. For further discussion of the legal ramifications of this distinction, see
infra Part II.
17. The issue of deal protection provisions in negotiated acquisitions recently
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has produced four opinions addressing deal protection provisionsPhelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.," ACE Ltd. v.
Capital Re Corp., 9 In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation,"' and Wisconsin Investment Board v. Bartlett.21
Unfortunately, these opinions seem to be inconsistent not only with
prior Delaware jurisprudence but also with each other. All four of the
cases involve the use of deal protection provisions in the context of
Yet two of the Chancery Court's recent
friendly acquisitions.
decisions-Phelps Dodge and ACE-cast serious doubt on the
validity of strong deal protection provisions, portraying them as a
potential violation of the board's duty of care, while the other two
decisions-IXC and Bartlett-suggest that deal protection provisions
should be deemed valid as an exercise of the target board's business
judgment.
The Chancery Court's deal protection decisions introduce a lack of
legal clarity into an area of high economic stakes. The ability to
protect deals may have a direct bearing on the U.S. merger market,
which in spite of a steady decline over the past two years, still
represented $134.6 billion in completed transactions in the third
quarter of 2002.22 Until the Delaware Supreme Court issues a
reasoned opinion resolving these inconsistencies, 23 the lack of clarity
of the law in this area threatens to burden the merger market with
uncertainty, leaving the ultimate rule on deal protections unknown.
This article draws upon the insights of game theory and cognitive
psychology to supply a theoretical account of deal protections. It will
argue that the Chancery Court's decisions can be understood as a
response to the last period problem facing the target management
team in its last period of play. By focusing the analysis on the last
period problem of target managers, this article seeks to harmonize the
apparent inconsistencies in the Chancery Court's decisions and to
arose in the Delaware Supreme Court's order reversing the Chancery Court and
enjoining the merger between NCS Healthcare and Genesis Health Ventures. See
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., Nos. 605, 649, 2002 Del. LEXIS 723 (Del.
Dec. 10, 2002). When this article went to print, the Supreme Court's opinion
explaining the order had not been issued. As discussed in Part II.C., however, this
decision is not likely to represent the final word on the issue since whatever opinion
ultimately issues from the court is likely to include a strong dissent and to be highly
contestable on a number of bases. See infra Part II.C (analyzing the order in the
context of the opinion below and the issues presented in this article).
18. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
19. 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
20. Nos. 17324,17334, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
21. C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
22. See M&A Scoreboard3Q2002, Mergers & Acquisitions, Nov. 2002 (compiling
data from the Thompson Financial Merger & Corporate Transactions database).
23. The opinion finally issued in connection with Omnicare is not likely to settle
the issues raised by deal protections in negotiated acquisitions. See infra Part II.C.
(analyzing the order in the context of the opinion below and the issues presented in
this article).
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situate the Chancery's approach within a broader corporate law
context. It proceeds as follows:
Part II situates the Chancery Court's deal protection decisions
within existing Delaware law. It finds that Delaware courts have
addressed deal protections on prior occasions, but generally in
opinions concerning hostile takeover battles, a context that is not
clearly applicable to friendly mergers. The Chancery Court's deal
protection decisions do not fit the analytical standards derived from
the takeover context and require a more subtle analysis than the
simple creation of categories for either deference or scrutiny.
Part III reviews the existing commentary on the Chancery Court's
decisions. No commentator has yet produced a theory capable of
harmonizing these decisions either with each other or with current
Delaware law.
Instead, the commentary attempts to fit the
Chancery's deal protection decisions into one set or another of
outmoded or inapplicable doctrinal principles. The result is a
collection of incompletely theorized, predominantly normative
accounts that criticize the opposing side of the Phelps Dodge,
A CE/IXC, Bartlett divide.
Part IV identifies the last period problem of the target's
management team as the impetus of judicial concern in merger
decisions.
An exploration of the forces ordinarily thought to
constrain the decision-making of managers and directors reveals that
these constraints no longer apply in the last period of play.
Unconstrained in their choice of a merger partner, the decisions of
managers and directors may serve their crass self-interest or may be
subtly infected with psychological biases.
Part V explores Delaware's approach to unconstrained last period
incentives in the context of corporate law, focusing on the notorious
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.24
In spite of a roundly criticized conclusion, the substance of which was
later repealed by the Delaware legislature,25 the Smith opinion yields
a useful approach to the last period problem, focusing on procedural
constraints rather than judicial oversight.
Part VI assesses the Chancery Court's deal protection decisions as a
response to the last period problem. Viewed in this light, the
decisions are consistent with each other, each reaching a different
conclusion as a result of the presence or absence of constraints in the
last period. The decisions are thus a further development of the
approach of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith, seeking to

24. 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
25. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (authorizing a corporation to
include in its certificate of incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating the
personal liability of directors for good faith breaches of the duty of care).
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reinvigorate procedural constraints in order to protect shareholder
welfare.26
The article then closes, in Part VII, with a brief summary and
conclusion.
II.

CASES

Delaware courts had addressed deal protection provisions prior to7
the announcement of the Chancery Court's recent decisions.
However, most earlier decisions seek to apply the enhanced
scrutiny/change of control paradigm that evolved out of the court's
classic hostile takeover cases-that is Unocal, Revlon, Time Warner,
and QVC. This paradigm is not well suited to handle the problems
raised by deal protection provisions in friendly acquisitions and,
ultimately, fails to explain the Chancery Court's decisions.
A.

Takeover Cases and Deal Protections

The first of the classic Delaware decisions in the takeover context is
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,2 in which Unocal, an oil
company with a liquidation value in excess of its market
capitalization, attracted the attention of notorious "raider" T. Boone
Pickens. In an effort to win control of Unocal away from its
incumbent board, Pickens launched a two-tiered, front-end loaded
tender offer for Unocal shares. In response, Unocal proposed to buy
back a portion of its own shares in a self-tender offer, but excluded
Pickens' shares from the offer. In its evaluation of the Unocal board's
response to Pickens' offer, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to
announce a rule that would narrow the scope of the business
judgment rule, at least in the context of hostile takeovers.
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation
to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the
26. This article treats shareholder welfare maximization as the fundamental
purpose of corporate law. The conclusions regarding the potential destructiveness of
management decision-making in the last period and the explanation of the Chancery
Court's deal protection decisions as a response to this structural problem, however,
do not require the adoption of any one view of the purpose of corporate law. The
arguments and conclusions of this article should thus comport with any corporate law
theory, except perhaps one that stresses CEO welfare maximization.
27. See, e.g., Renaissance Communications Corp. v. Nat'l Broad. Corp., Inc.,
Civ.A. No. 14446, 1995 WL 1798510, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1995) (Allen, C.)
(suggesting that strong deal protections would be permitted after an auction had been
conducted on the basis that it would be "self-defeating" for the law to say that all
higher and later prices require a breach of the original agreement since the auction
would never end and the bidders' best prices would therefore never emerge); Rand v.
W. Air Lines, C.A. No. 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994)
(Berger, V.C.) (upholding, under Revlon analysis, a no-shop provision with no
fiduciary out).
28. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is
no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its
decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise
would be accorded in the realm of business judgment. There are,
however, certain caveats to a proper exercise of this function.
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.29
The Unocal decision established a two-part test. First, the board
must identify a reasonable threat to the target corporation's policy
and effectiveness. Second, the board's response to that threat must be
proportional to the threat presented.30 Because a two-tiered, frontend loaded tender offer amounts to a "structurally coercive" takeover
tactic, 31 the court found Unocal's exclusionary self-tender to be an
appropriate response.
The second classic decision, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings,32 involved another raider, this time Ron Perelman, and
another underperforming corporation, Revlon.
After working
through a series of maneuvers, designed to evade Perelman, Revlon
ultimately decided to pursue a leveraged deal with a "white knight"
acquiror, Forstmann Little, which agreed to buy Revlon and let
incumbent management run it, provided that Revlon would sell off
some of its business divisions and remained capable of servicing its
debt obligations. The Revlon board agreed to the Forstmann deal
even as Perelman agreed to exceed any Forstmann offer. This, the
Delaware Supreme Court said, was too much.
Because either
transaction would result in the breakup of the corporation, the board
would be required to get the best deal for its shareholders.
[I]t became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was
inevitable.
The Revlon board's authorization permitting
management to negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was
a recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board

29. Id. at 954.
30. Id. at 955 ("If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.").
31. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware'sIntermediate Standard
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. Law.
247, 267 (1989) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard]
(categorizing the types of coercion present in a tender offer). A two-tiered, front-end
loaded tender offer creates pressure to tender by creating a kind of prisoner's
dilemma on the part of the target's shareholders. The collectively optimal outcome
for the target's shareholders might be to hold out for a higher offer. By promising,
however, to treat shareholders who tender better than shareholders who refuse, a
two-tiered, front-end loaded offer creates pressure to defect from the collectively
optimal outcome.
32. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit.... The whole question of defensive measures
became moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price
for the stockholders at a sale of the company."

With this holding, the Delaware Supreme Court created so-called
"Revlon duties" requiring the maximization of short term value to
shareholders when the company is broken up or sold. After Revlon,
the question remained: what triggered Revlon duties?"
It took a combination of subsequent decisions to define the Revlon
trigger. The first of these came in ParamountCommunications,Inc. v.
Time, Inc.," which can be read to stand for the broad proposition that
"strategic" mergers do not trigger Revlon duties. In Time Warner,
Paramount launched a hostile bid for Time after Time and Warner
had agreed to merge. Fearing that its shareholders would reject the
Warner merger in favor of Paramount's premium offer, thus
destroying "Time Culture,"36 Time and Warner maneuvered to

protect their transaction.37 When Paramount and a number of Time
shareholders sued to enjoin these defensive maneuverings, the
33. Id. at 182.
34. See Ronald J.Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 37 (1990) (discussing various possible bases for the change of control
test, all but one of which has now assumed the character of roads not taken).
35. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
36. See id. at 1143, n.4. A more cynical view of "Time Culture" may see the
phrase as a lawyer-magician's incantation of the magic words necessary to avoid
judicial scrutiny of the multi-million dollar contracts and millions in stock options
extended to Time's senior management in connection with the merger with Warner.
See Richard M. Clurman, To the End of Time: The Seduction and Conquest of a
Media Empire 234-37 (1992) (detailing the economics of the side-deals with
management). If "Time Culture" meant anything, it appeared to mean the simple
preservation of an entity without regard to its external cultural or economic functions.
See Joel Edan Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal
Fiction, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 31, 39-40 (1996) [hereinafter Friedlander, Kulturkampf]
("At the time of its combination with Warner, Time had ceased devoting itself to
uncovering the truth underlying the week's news, and it had subordinated the
interests of its shareholders to the claims of the corporate body itself.") (citations
omitted).
37. Among the broad deal protection maneuverings engaged in by the Time
board was a restructuring of the transaction to eliminate the need for a vote by Time's
shareholders. DGCL § 251 requires a vote of the shareholders to approve a stock
merger. Because the merger had been structured with Time as the acquiror, its
shareholders were not required to vote under Delaware law. However, New York
Stock Exchange rules require companies issuing over 20% of their voting equity in
connection with a transaction to obtain shareholder approval. See New York Stock
Exchange Listed Company Manual, Listing Standard 312.03(c). Because Time was to
issue over 20% of its equity, it would be required to obtain shareholder approval
pursuant to the NYSE rules. Structured as a cash acquisition, however, the NYSE
rules would not apply and Delaware law does not require shareholder approval for
either party to a cash acquisition. Thus the requirement of a shareholder vote was
effectively eliminated.
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Delaware Supreme Court refused to apply Revlon duties. Instead,
because Time had not "abandon[ed] its long-term strategy [to] seek[]
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company,"3
the Time board was not required to maximize the consideration paid
in the deal.39 It could continue to follow its long-term plans, and when
those plans included a "synergistic" merger, it was not required to
abandon them in order to chase after short-term share prices.
In the Chancery Court, Chancellor Allen rested his decision on the
fact that Time was diffusely held before the deal and would be
diffusely held after the deal.4" Control of Time did not change, in
other words, because control remained in the market.
If the appropriate inquiry is whether a change in control is
contemplated, the answer must be sought in the specific
circumstances surrounding the transaction. Surely under some
circumstances a stock for stock merger could reflect a transfer of
corporate control. That would, for example, plainly be the case here
if Warner were a private company. But where, as here, the shares of
both constituent corporations are widely held, corporate control can
be expected to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger....
[N]either corporation could be said to be acquiring the other.

38. Time Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150. The Supreme Court noted the circumstances
under which Revlon generally applied:
Under Delaware law there are.., two circumstances which may implicate
Revlon duties. The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. However, Revlon
duties may also be triggered where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company.
Id. (citation omitted). Time's negotiations with Warner thus had not triggered the
requirement that it maximize short term share value by putting itself up for sale to
any and all comers.
39. It is worth noting that Paramount asserted only a Unocal claim against Time,
while the Time shareholders asserted, in addition, a Revlon claim. The Supreme
Court's resolution of the Unocal claim, on the proportionality prong, was predicated
upon its Revlon analysis. In the words of the court: "Here ...Time's responsive
action to Paramount's tender offer was not aimed at 'cramming down' on its
shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the
carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form. Thus, the response
was reasonably related to the threat." Id. at 1154-55. In other words, a response will
be reasonably related to the threat posed as long as it amounts to the carrying
forward of a pre-existing strategy, and a board is free to carry forward strategies other
than short term value maximization provided that it is not subject to Revlon duties.
In other words, as long as the target board is not under Revlon and can argue that its
plan pre-dates the appearance of the unsolicited bid, Unocal will not force it to deal
with unsolicited bidders.
40. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., C.A. Nos. 10866, 10670,
10935, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *68-69 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989, revised July 17,
1989) (Allen, C.).
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Control of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market.4 1
The Supreme Court in Time Warner accepted Chancellor Allen's
findings regarding the diffuse shareholdings of the combined
company, 42 but it ultimately decided the case on different groundsthat is, Revlon duties did not apply where there was no looming
break-up of the target. 43 Chancellor Allen's control-in-the-market
reasoning
ultimately
returned,
however,
in
Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,44 where it furnished the
basis of what is now the test for a change in control.
QVC involved the bidding contest between QVC and Viacom for
Paramount. Once it had agreed to merge with Viacom, Paramount
protected its agreement with deal protection provisions and refused to
negotiate further with QVC.45 When QVC sued, asserting that
Paramount had violated its fiduciary duties in refusing to negotiate,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Paramount-Viacom
merger had indeed triggered Revlon duties which the Paramount
board violated by not dealing with QVC. 46 Although this was a stock41. Id. Professor Eisenberg offers a concise criticism of this theory:
This control-remains-in-the-market concept cannot be taken at face value.
The market is not a sentient creature. It does not vote, it does not install
managers, it does not remove managers and, in short, it does not have
control. If shareholdings are so widely dispersed that no shareholders have
control, still someone has control. We have known since Berle & Means who
that someone is-management. Therefore, in any transaction involving the
combination of two corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings in
which one corporation's management ends up in the driver's seat, control of
the other corporation has shifted.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Director'sDuty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions,51 U.
Miami L. Rev. 579, 602 (1997).
42. See Time Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150 ("The Chancellor's findings of fact are
supported by the record and his conclusion is correct as a matter of law.").
43. Id. at 1151.
44. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
45. The deal protection provisions included a no shop provision, a termination
fee, and a stock option agreement favoring Viacom. See id. at 39-40. The no-shop
stated that Paramount would not discuss business combinations with any third party
unless (i) the third party bid was not subject to any financial contingencies and (ii) the
Paramount board decided that its fiduciary duties required it to negotiate with the
third party. The termination fee gave Viacom $100 million if the deal fell through,
and the stock option agreement provided that if the termination fee was triggered,
Viacom would also have the option of buying 24 million shares of outstanding
Paramount stock at $69 per share, a discount from the then-current market price.
The option agreement further gave Viacom the right to require Paramount to pay the
difference between the $69 and the market price for the 24 million shares instead of
having to buy and then sell the shares itself. Paramount was also protected by a
poison pill which it agreed to redeem in order to merge with Viacom but refused to
redeem for QVC.
46. Id. at 44 ("In the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one
primary objective-to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably
available for the stockholders-and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to
further that end.") (citing Revlon).
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for-stock deal structurally similar to the Time-Warner merger, the
result of the Paramount-Viacom combination would be that a single
shareholder, Sumner Redstone, dominated the corporation. Thus, in
contrast to the entity resulting from the Time-Warner merger, which
would remain diffusely held, shareholders in the new ParamountViacom entity would find that they were minority shareholders in a
corporation dominated by one man.
In the case before us, the public stockholders (in the aggregate)
currently own a majority of Paramount's voting stock. Control of
the corporation is not vested in a single person, entity, or group, but
vested in the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders. In the
event the Paramount-Viacom transaction is consummated, the
public stockholders will receive cash and a minority equity voting
position in the surviving corporation.
Following such
consummation, there will be a controlling stockholder who will have
the voting power to: (a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up ofthe
corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-out the
public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of incorporation; (f)
sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g) otherwise
alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public
stockholders' interests. Irrespective of the present Paramount
Board's vision of a long-term strategic alliance with Viacom, the
proposed sale of control would provide the
new controlling
47
stockholder with the power to alter that vision.
Redstone's ability to cash out the minority shareholders at his whim
and the minority's inability ever again to sell for a control premium,
since Redstone alone possessed control and could sell it and keep any
resulting premium for himself, caused the court to note that
something "of considerable significance to the Paramount
stockholders" had occurred. 48 Most basically, the Paramount-Viacom
merger represented the last chance the Paramount shareholders
would ever have to be paid a control premium, and as a result, the
board was under Revlon duties to negotiate the best deal it could
get. 49 The logic of the QVC rule thus followed Chancellor Allen's
reasoning in Time Warner: a sale that resulted in a diffusely held
corporation coming under the influence of a controlling shareholder
would result in a "change in control," triggering Revlon duties."
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id.
49. The court went on to say:
Once control has shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will have no
leverage in the future to demand another control premium. As a result, the
Paramount stockholders are entitled to receive, and should receive, a
control premium.... [T]he Paramount directors had an obligation to take
the maximum advantage of the current opportunity to realize for the
stockholders the best value reasonably available.
Id.
50. In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., the court made clear that it
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What rule can be extracted from this line of cases? Most simply:
Revlon duties are triggered by a sale of control. A sale of control
involves a sale of all shares for cash, as in Revlon, or an exchange of
shares for stock resulting in a combined company with a majority
shareholder, as in QVC. If, on the other hand, the deal involves an
exchange of shares and results in the combined company being
diffusely held, there is no change in control and, as long as the merger
is undertaken as a part of the long term strategic thinking of the
board, no duty to negotiate with other bidders, as in Time Warner.
The conduct of the board and the terms of the agreement in this
context would receive business judgment deference from the
Delaware courts. If, however, the deal is not a result of the long-term
strategic thinking of the board but rather a short-term defensive
tactic, Unocal may apply to subject the transaction and its terms to
enhanced scrutiny. Still, as in Time Warner, Unocal should not apply
to force negotiations with a subsequent bidder where the initial
transaction is entered as a result of a pre-existing strategy of the
board.
Unfortunately, rules derived from these classic takeover cases do
not apply cleanly to deal protection provisions in the context of
friendly acquisitions. At first glance, Unocal may appear to supply the
most appropriate standard since deal protection provisions are
arguably "defensive" in the sense that they defend the merger
agreement from unwanted interference."' As further support for this
view, a dictum in the Time Warner opinion suggests that deal
protection provisions adopted in response to an actual "threat" from
another bidder would receive enhanced scrutiny: "such [structural
safety] devices are properly subject to a Unocal analysis."52
Moreover, recent remarks of Vice Chancellor Strine, albeit issued
from the lectern rather than the bench, support the application of
Unocal to deal protection provisions.5 3
would grant deference to stock mergers even when a company with a very large
market capitalization acquires a company with a very small market capitalization. See
650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
51. Two former Chancery Court clerks have argued that deal protection
provisions should trigger enhanced Unocal scrutiny because they are
"defensive." Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck:
Determining the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals
Transactions, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 8 [hereinafter Lebovitch and
Morrison, Duck].
Deal Protections are inherently defensive in nature. They give rise to the
omnipresent specter of director self-interest.
The potential for selfinterested behavior arising from defensive action triggers enhanced scrutiny.
Therefore, courts should apply Unocal with full force to Deal Protections in
the merger of equals context.
Id. at 14.
52. Paramount Communications v. Time Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del.
1989).
53. In statements issued from the lectern rather than the bench, Vice Chancellor
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Even on its own terms, however, the threat/response paradigm
drawn from Unocal does not easily fit the context of deal protection
provisions. As an initial matter, it is not at all clear how the "threat"
should be defined in the context of a friendly deal. The most
commonly cited "threat" of a hostile tender offer is that shareholders
will tender at a sub-optimal price as a result of coercion.54 In the
context of a stock merger, however, bidders cannot coerce a sale
because they must go through the target's board of directors, and
shareholders only vote on potential transactions brought to them by
the board. Because of this intervening role of the board in the context
of stock deals as opposed to cash tender offers, the threat that the
company will be forced into a sale at a sub-optimal price is not a real
possibility. Directors will not bring inadequate bids before their
shareholders, and if they do, the shareholders will vote no. There is
simply no coercion.
Moreover, Unocal does not appear to apply to deal protections
adopted prior to the appearance of a hostile bidder. In this context,
target boards may view deal protections as a means of guarding
against being put in play-that is, becoming vulnerable to hostile bids
as a result of merger negotiations." In Time Warner, the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that deal protections adopted for this reason
would be accorded business judgment deference:
[T]here is substantial evidence to support each of the trial court's...
conclusions. Thus, the court found that [the various safety devices]
predated any takeover threat by Paramount and had been adopted
for a rational business purpose: to deter Time and Warner from
being "put in play" by their March 4 Agreement.56
The implication of this language is that deal protection provisions
adopted outside of the context of a hostile takeover fight should be
judged according to the business judgment rule and thus permitted as
serving a "rational business purpose." Moreover, because all deal
Strine seems to have endorsed the application of Unocal scrutiny to deal protection
provisions. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., CategoricalConfusion: Deal Protection Measures in
Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. Law. 919, 939 (2001) [hereinafter Strine,
Categorical Confusion] ("In the end, practitioners looking for reasonable certainty
might do better under a regime that requires courts to apply the Unocal standard to
deal protection measures..
").
54. Commentators have suggested three broad categories of threats from which
target boards may seek to defend themselves-opportunity loss, structural coercion,
and substantive coercion-all focusing on the risk that target shareholders will accept
an under-priced hostile offer. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard, supra note 31, at 267; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) ("This Court has held that the 'inadequate value' of an all cash
for all shares offer is a 'legally cognizable threat."') (citation omitted).
55. See supra Part I.
56. Time Warner, 571 A.2d at 1151 n.15 (emphasis added). The deal protection
provisions, or "structural safety devices," referred to by the court were contained in
the parties' Share Exchange Agreement.
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protection provisions in friendly merger agreements can be said to
have been adopted for the rational business purpose of preventing the
parties from being put in play, this language strongly suggests that all
deal protection provisions in stock mergers should be deemed valid
under the business judgment rule.
Time Warner thus simultaneously provides support for applying
either Unocal scrutiny or business judgment rule deference to deal
protections.17 Which of the two levels of scrutiny applies depends,
according to the logic of the Time Warner decision, upon whether the
deal protections were adopted in connection with a transaction that is
the culmination of the board's long term strategic thinking-in which
case the agreement and the business judgment that it embodies will
not be disturbed-or whether the transaction containing the
provisions amounted to a short term defensive tactic, more responsive
to a hostile bidder's offer than any long term strategy, in which case
Unocal scrutiny will apply. The Supreme Court's takeover decisions
thus suggest dividing deal protection provisions into two categories:
those that are adopted in response to an unsolicited takeover bid and
those that are adopted to deter merger partners from being put in
play, with the former to receive Unocal scrutiny and the latter to
receive business judgment rule deference.
Fortunately, one need not linger over the coherence of this
division-after all, the desire to avoid being put in play does not
merely amount to a foresightful expression of the wish not to receive
unsolicited takeover bids-because the Chancery Court's deal
protection decisions explode such simplistic categorizations. Two of
the four decisions, IXC and Bartlett, are inconsistent with the
approach treating deal protection provisions as preemptive responses
to takeover bids and therefore deserving of enhanced scrutiny. The
other two decisions, Phelps Dodge and ACE, are inconsistent with the
approach that would treat all deal protection provisions with
deference under the business judgment rule as responses to the threat
of being put in play.
57. Notwithstanding the importance of this distinction for placing transactions in
one doctrinal category or another, the application of Unocal scrutiny may not differ
substantially in practical effect from the application of business judgment deference.
Unocal has been de-fanged. It no longer substantially constrains board conduct.
According to an empirical study conducted by Professors Thompson and Smith,
between 1985, when Unocal came down, and the end of 2000, only thirty-four Court
of Chancery opinions and eight Supreme Court opinions worked through the entire
Unocal analysis to a conclusion. In almost every one of these cases a legally
cognizable threat is found and, although the Chancery Court is more aggressive under
the proportionality prong, the Supreme Court has not found defensive tactics to be
disproportionate outside of a Revlon context and, where a Chancery Court finding of
disproportionality has been appealed, has consistently reversed or voided this finding.
See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261, 28486 (2001).
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The Chancery Court's decisions show that standards and categories
evolved from takeover cases ill-fit the analysis of deal protections in
the context of friendly acquisitions. Instead, the Chancery Court's
decisions reveal a more subtle dynamic at play on target boards in the
context of a friendly acquisition-that is, target management's
awareness of its last period of play. The Chancery Court's tentative
response to this problem produces a more nuanced approach than the
basic doctrinal categories derived from the old takeover cases.
Moreover, the Chancery Court's approach does draw upon a doctrinal
ancestor, but as discussed in Part V below, this ancestor is Smith v.
Van Gorkom, not the Supreme Court's takeover cases.
B.

The Chancery Court's Deal ProtectionDecisions

The first of the Chancery Court's decisions involved the hostile
exchange offer of Phelps Dodge Corporation for both Cyprus Amax
Minerals Company and Asarco Inc. after Cyprus and Asarco had
agreed to merge." The merger agreement between Cyprus and
Asarco contained strong deal protection provisions, including a notalk provision, which prohibited either of the parties to the agreement
from negotiating with, among others, Phelps Dodge.59 Phelps Dodge
therefore sued to enjoin the merger agreement as a breach of the
fiduciary duties of the Cyprus board.
The decision of the court, if restricted to the narrow holding, is
unremarkable. Chancellor Chandler refused to issue the injunction
because there was no likelihood of irreparable harm since, given the
upcoming shareholder vote, the Cyprus shareholders could simply
reject the original merger, thus freeing the board to pursue the Phelps
Dodge bid.6"
In dicta, however, the Chancellor expressed his
discomfort with strong deal protection provisions, specifically notalks, and suggested that Phelps Dodge had demonstrated a
"reasonable probability of success on the merits" in its challenge to
such provisions.6
[T]he decision not to negotiate, in my opinion, must be an informed
one. A target can refuse to negotiate under Time Warner, but it
should be informed when making such refusal.

... No-talk provisions.., are troubling precisely because they
prevent a board from meeting its duty to make an informed
58. See Phelps Dodge Proposes To Acquire Asarco and Cyprus Amax in Stock
Transactions at Approximate 30% Premiums, Bus. Wire, Aug. 20, 1999.

59. This was a particularly strong no-talk provision because it did not contain any
fiduciary out. For a discussion of fiduciary outs, see supra note 14.
60. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. 17398, 17383,
17427, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
61. Id. at *3.
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judgment with2 respect to even considering whether to negotiate with
a third party.
The Chancellor based his remarks on the board's duty of care.
Now, this should not be understood to suggest that Cyprus or
Asarco were legally required to or even should have negotiated,
privately or otherwise, with Phelps Dodge. It is to say, rather, that
they simply should not have completely foreclosed the opportunity
to do so, as this is the legal equivalent of willful blindness, a
blindness that may constitute a breach of a board's duty of care; that
is, the duty to take care to be informed of all material information
reasonably available.63
After the court's decision, both Cyprus and Asarco postponed their
shareholder meetings to explore alternatives and later entered into
merger agreements with Phelps Dodge.
The second of the Chancery Court's quartet of deal protection
cases arose from the bidding contest between two British Virgin
Islands-based insurance companies, ACE Limited and XL Capital
Limited, for the New York-based reinsurer Capital Re Corporation.
After Capital Re suffered two bad quarters," ACE, which had an
existing strategic relationship with Capital Re, including a $75 million
investment commitment, two board seats, and a joint venture,
entered into a merger agreement with Capital Re, whereby Capital
Re shareholders would be given ACE shares in exchange for their
Capital Re stock. The merger agreement contained a no-talk
provision with an exception permitting Capital Re to negotiate with
third party bidders if it received written advice from counsel that such
negotiations were "required in order to prevent the Board of
Directors ... from breaching its fiduciary duties. 6 7 Significantly,
ACE also obtained voting agreements from holders of 33.5% of
Capital Re's shares, which, together with its own 12.3% stake, made
shareholder approval of the merger agreement highly likely.
However, because the market price of ACE stock slid considerably in
the months following the signing of the agreement, 9 XL Capital
62. Id. at *34.
63. Id. at *4-5.
64. See Morton A. Pierce et al., Delaware Court: 'No Talk' Provisions No Good,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 2000, at S9 (noting further that the Phelps Dodge/Asarco
agreement was ultimately terminated when Asarco received a superior proposal from
a third party).
65. See XL Quits Cap Re Bidding War; Cap Re Posts Net Loss, BestWire, Nov. 10,

1999 (noting that in 1999 Capital Re posted a $39.2 million third-quarter net loss after
posting a $106.8 million second quarter net loss).
66. See Gavin Souter, Value of ACE Offer Tied to Stock Price: XL Bids for
Capital Re, Bus. Ins., Oct. 11, 1999, at 1.
67. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 98 (Del. Ch. 1999).
68. See id. at 97-98.
69. The fall in the ACE share price caused the consideration offered to fall from
over $17 per Capital Re share to less than $10 per share, with the total deal value
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launched a competing bid for the company. Capital Re then entered
negotiations with XL Capital and threatened to terminate its
agreement with ACE unless ACE increased its offer. After increasing
its offer only to be topped a second time by XL Capital, ACE sued for
injunctive relief to prevent Capital Re from terminating the
agreement on the grounds that without a written opinion from
counsel regarding the board's fiduciary duties, the merger contract
barred Capital Re from negotiating with XL Capital.
ACE has a unique set of facts-contractually guaranteed
shareholder approval and a fiduciary out provision that appeared to
disable the decision-making authority of the board. Given the
procedural posture of the case-an acquiror suing to prevent the
target from trying to increase the value of the transaction to its
shareholders-it is not surprising that the court would refuse to issue
the injunctive relief. After reciting several arguments for his refusal
to grant the restraining order,7" each of which was closely related to
the unique facts of the case, Vice Chancellor Strine went on to state in
broad language:
It is one thing for a board of directors to agree not to play footsie
with other potential bidders or to stir up an auction. That type of
restriction is perfectly understandable, if not necessary, if good faith
business transactions are to be encouraged. It is quite another thing
for a board of directors to enter into a merger agreement that
precludes the board from considering any other offers.... Such a
contractual commitment is particularly suspect when a failure to
consider other offers guarantees the consummation of the original
transaction, however more valuable an alternative transaction may
falling from $605.9 million (BVI) when made to $375.3 million (BVI) when XL
Capital launched its offer. See Gavin Souter, Buying Spree Sets Up ACE, XL
Showdown, Bus. Ins., Dec. 20, 1999, at 16.
70. First, because ACE's voting stake and voting agreements virtually assured
shareholder approval of the transaction, Capital Re would be forced to consummate
the merger in spite of the dramatic decline in value of the merger consideration (ACE
stock). Although this may have been exactly what the parties bargained for in the
merger agreement, the court emphasized the harshness of this result, thus implying a
duty to negotiate further at least when the market value of the merger partner's stock
tanks. See ACE, 747 A.2d at 103. Second, limiting the target's ability to negotiate to
a written determination of counsel that such negotiations were a fiduciary
requirement amounted to an "abdication" or "self-disablement" on the part of the
board to manage corporate affairs in its own good faith judgment. Id. at 106-07. But
see Michael J. Kennedy, Whole Lotta Fiduciating Goin' On!, M&A Law., Feb. 2002,
at 1 ("[T]he only way a board composed of lay people can decide, in good faith, what
its legal obligations are, is to ask a lawyer."). Third, ACE's interpretation of the notalk clause would render the exception meaningless since, in a non-change of control
setting, there is no situation in which a target board is legally required to negotiate
with another bidder. See ACE, 747 A.2d at 107-08. Fourth and finally, if the Capital
Re board mistakenly believed that it had negotiated a meaningful exception to the
no-talk provision when it in fact had not, that mistake itself may be seen as a failure
of the duty of care, supplying the court with a reason to protect the Capital Re
shareholders from the error of their directors. Id. at 108-09.
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be and however less valuable the original transaction may have
become.... 71
Moreover, Vice Chancellor Strine stated clearly that although a stockfor-stock merger involves no "change of control" and therefore no
"Revlon duties" to maximize short term shareholder value, 2 the
absence of such duties may not make a difference:
The fact that the board has no Revlon duties does not mean that it
can contractually bind itself to sit idly by and allow an unfavorable
transaction to occur that its own actions have brought
and preclusive
73
about.

Although these broad statements are technically dicta, the court's
willingness to imply a fiduciary duty to investigate other deals when
the agreement is otherwise locked up indicates a willingness to
invalidate strong deal protection provisions.
Unusual though the facts in ACE were, similar issues arose in a
dispute involving a suit to enjoin the shareholder vote on the merger
agreement between IXC Communications, Inc. and Cincinnati Bell,
Inc., the third case in the Chancery's quartet of deal protection
decisions. The IXC/Cincinnati Bell merger agreement contained
strong deal protections, including no-talk and no-solicitation
provisions,74 and, like the Capital Re/ACE agreement, was secured by
voting agreements locking up approximately 45% of the target's
stock." Unlike the agreement in ACE, however, the IXC/Cincinnati
Bell agreement emerged from a process in which IXC had solicited
the interest of a number of prospective bidders. The IXC board had
engaged an investment banker and announced that it would consider
transaction proposals. Having generated considerable interest leading
to negotiations and diligence review with a number of companies in
the industry, 6 the IXC board decided on a stock merger with
Cincinnati Bell. A number of IXC shareholders then sued to enjoin
the agreement, alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty
in agreeing to the deal protection provisions.
71. ACE, 747 A.2d at 106 (footnotes and citations omitted).
72. Id. at 105; see supra text accompanying note 50 (discussing the change of
control trigger of Revlon duties).
73. 747 A.2d at 108.
74. The no-talk provision was removed by the parties prior to entering litigation,
perhaps as a response to the Phelps Dodge decision. However, Vice Chancellor
Steele approved the validity of the provision as agreed at the time the agreement was
signed, so the removal of the no-talk was not a factor in the court's analysis. See In re
IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS
210, at *16-17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
75. The voting agreement was in connection with a side transaction between
Cincinnati Bell and General Electric Pension Trust ("GEPT") in which Cincinnati
Bell agreed to acquire GEPT's IXC shares and GEPT agreed, in connection with that
sale, to support the IXC/Cincinnati Bell merger. See id. at *7-8.
76. See id. at *4-5.
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In stark contrast to the Chancery decisions in Phelps Dodge and
ACE, however, Vice Chancellor Steele deferred to the business
judgment of the IXC board in approving the deal protections in the
IXC/Cincinnati Bell merger agreement. Not only did the court in
IXC depart from the ACE court in its treatment of a key factual
issue-the 40-50% voting arrangements, treated as a "locked up" vote
in ACE but merely as "almost locked up" in IXC77-but the opinion
also seems directly to contradict the dicta in Phelps Dodge and ACE
suggesting that no-talk provisions may be invalid per se. In IXC, Vice
Chancellor Steele stated:
Further, the assertion that the board "willfully blinded" itself by
approving the now defunct "no-talk" provision in the Merger
Agreement is unpersuasive....
Provisions such as these are
common in merger agreements
and
do not imply some automatic
78
breach of fiduciary duty.
Dispensing with the plaintiffs' assertions that the IXC board had
failed adequately to inform itself of other proposals, the court
endorsed the pre-merger solicitation process employed by IXC's
investment bankers.
Balancing the desire to avoid appearing
"desperate," 79 thus creating a "fire sale"8"' atmosphere unlikely to
result in the best deal for its shareholders, against the desire to
identify potential suitors, IXC announced that it would consider the
possibility of a sale or merger but did not make outbound
solicitations. Nevertheless, this simple announcement led to "a series
of contacts with varying degrees of interest expressed and efforts
undertaken in pursuit of those expressions." 1 Citing this process with
approval, the Chancery Court emphasized IXC's pre-signing market
77. In ACE, the Capital Re shareholder vote was 45.8% locked up, while in IXC
the vote was just over 40% locked up, a difference of approximately 5%, but enough
for Vice Chancellor Steele to comment:
The defendants have not, in fact, "locked up" an absolute majority of the
votes required for the merger ....Plaintiffs ...tacitly admit that the votebuying agreement does not make the outcome of the vote a foregone
conclusion. They can only say that the ...deal "almost completely lock[s]
up the vote -thus giving shareholders scant power to defeat the Merger..."
(emphasis added). "Almost locked up" does not mean "locked up," and
"scant power" may mean less power, but it decidedly does not mean "no
power."
Id. at *23-24. For Vice Chancellor Strine in ACE, "almost locked up" did appear to
mean "locked up" and "scant power" came close enough to "no power" to invalidate
the no-talk provision, yet Vice Chancellor Steele went on in IXC to conclude that
because "a numerical majority of IXC shareholders are still in a position
independently to void [the] vote-buying transaction," the shareholders are not
disenfranchised and the shareholder vote remains as a valid test of the
IXC/Cincinnati Bell transaction. Id. at *24.
78. Id. at *16-17.
79. Id. at *4.
80. Id. at *14.
81. Id. at *15.
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test, during which "[n]o superior offers were received and therefore
none were turned away, 82 and refused to enjoin the merger
agreement or invalidate any of its deal protection devices.
Soon after IXC, Vice Chancellor Steele had the opportunity to
reaffirm this less restrictive view of deal protection devices. In
Bartlett, a manager of Wisconsin pension funds sued to enjoin the
shareholder vote on the merger between Medco Research and King
Pharmaceuticals, claiming that the Medco directors had violated their
duties of care and loyalty in agreeing to the deal protection provisions
in the Medco/King merger agreement.8 3 After spending over two
years in search of a merger partner, during which time it had retained
an investment bank to solicit potential bidders, Medco agreed to
merge with King. The resulting agreement contained strong deal
protections, including no-shop and no-talk provisions, a termination
fee, and the grant of a stock option designed to defeat future attempts
at pooling-of-interest accounting.84 In challenging the agreement,
plaintiffs asserted that the Medco board members had not
"adequately inform[ed] themselves" and that the deal protections
"allowed [the company, through its negotiator] to steamroll past other
more favorable potential deals."85
As in IXC, Vice Chancellor Steele applied the business judgment
rule to the actions of the Medco board and to the deal protection
devices employed in the merger agreement. Responding to the claim
that the Medco board had failed adequately to inform itself, the court
noted that "the evidence equally supports the view that Medco's
board proceeded with the King merger because its efforts had failed
to find a viable combination with other suitors," 6 and emphasized the
solicitation of bids performed by Medco's investment bankers.
Medco, with the experience and assistance of [its investment bank,
H&Q], aggressively sought out suitors who might benefit from
Medco's existing drug pipeline and income stream. In fact, H&Q
played an integral part in Medco's efforts to canvass the market to
seek a more economically viable business combination.8v
The court also suggested that it was appropriate for the company to
rely on its investment bank's advice that "appearing 'over-shopped'
could frustrate any deal,""8 thus implying that at some point in the
solicitation process, it is appropriate for a target to select its partner

82. Id. at*16.
83. See Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at
"1-3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
84. Id. at *21 n.16. On the grant of stock options as "pooling killers," see supra
note 11 (discussing grant of 19.9% options as "pooling-killers").
85. Bartlett, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *7-8.
86. Id. at *17.
87. Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at *18.
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and protect its agreement. However, the court also noted that as an
agreement with King became imminent, Medco's bankers attempted
to "stimulate interest one last time regarding merger discussions with
other suitors." 9 Having repeatedly emphasized Medco's repeated
pre-signing market checks, the court went on to endorse Medco's use
of deal protection provisions in relatively broad language:
Delaware law permits lock-ups and related agreements "where their
adoption is untainted by director interest or other breaches of
fiduciary duty." Therefore, in the absence of breach of fiduciary
duty in agreeing to the lock-up devices, these provisions are
reviewable as business judgments and are, thus, granted deference.
Neither the collar, termination fee, no talk/no shop provision, nor
stock option agreements were used here as defensive mechanisms
instituted to respond to a perceived threat from a potential acquiror
making a competing bid for Medco.9"
The Chancery Court's treatment of deal protection provisions in
Phelps Dodge and ACE is thus difficult to square with its treatment of
these provisions in IXC and Bartlett. In Phelps Dodge and ACE, the
court applied heightened scrutiny to the contract and invalidated the
deal protection provisions. In IXC and Bartlett, the court was
deferential to the business judgment of the board in negotiating the
merger contract and validated the deal protection provisions.
One factual distinction between the cases is that in Phelps Dodge
and ACE, the target company had not shopped itself extensively or at
all prior to entering a highly protected merger agreement, while in
IXC and Bartlett, the target company had shopped itself considerably
before agreeing to deal protections. It is not clear, however, why this
factual distinction should make such a difference. Especially where,
as here, target boards are under no Revlon duty to maximize the value
of the transaction,9 it is not clear why a market-tested merger
agreement should receive greater deference than a merger agreement
that has not been extensively shopped. In the absence of a duty to
maximize the consideration received, it seems, courts should apply the
same standard to all such transactions regardless of the process by
which agreement was reached. What is needed, then, is a theoretical
foundation to account for the different treatment of deal protections
under Delaware law.

89. Id. at *22.
90. Id. at *30-31 (citing Revlon).
91. See supra text accompanying note 50 (discussing Revlon duties and the change
of control paradigm). The court in ACE acknowledged that Revlon duties do not
apply to the analysis of deal protections. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d
95,108 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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Making a Muddle: the Supreme Court's Order in NCS Healthcare

Unfortunately, recent developments in the Delaware courts suggest
that the lack of doctrinal clarity surrounding deal protections is likely
to persist, if not deepen. On December 10, 2002, a divided Delaware
Supreme Court issued an order enjoining the merger between NCS
Healthcare and Genesis Health Ventures.9 2 Although the order
contained very little analysis, it plainly suggests that merger
agreements with a submit-to-vote covenant,93 when combined with
voting agreements securing majority shareholder approval of the
transaction, must also contain provisions permitting the target
corporation to terminate the merger agreement in favor of a
subsequent superior offer.9" In other words, a complete fiduciary out
is required, and strong deal protection provisions are not permitted, in
any deal that both (i) requires the directors to submit the transaction
to a shareholder vote and (ii) guarantees, through voting agreements
with holders of a majority of the target's shares, shareholder approval
of the transaction. In the few sentences devoted to the basis of its
ruling, the court stated:
[T]he deal protection measures must be reasonable in relation to the
threat and neither preclusive nor coercive. The action of the NCS
board fails to meet those standards because, by approving the
Voting Agreements, the NCS board assured shareholder approval,
and by agreeing to a provision requiring that the merger be
presented to the shareholders, the directors irrevocably locked up
the merger. In the absence of a fiduciary out clause, this mechanism
precluded the directors from exercising their continuing fiduciary
obligation to9negotiate
a sale of the company in the interest of the
5
shareholders.
The terms "preclusive" and "coercive" suggest Unocal analysis and,
with it, the application of principles drawn from the takeover cases,
which this article has described as out-moded and ill-suited to the
context of negotiated acquisitions.96
This ruling creates a further muddle out of Delaware's deal
protection jurisprudence, apparently supporting the outcome of
Phelps Dodge and A CE over outcomes in line with the IXC and
Bartlett line of cases, but without providing a firm theoretical or
doctrinal basis. The lack of clarity surrounding the order's underlying
92. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., Nos. 605, 649, 2002 Del. LEXIS 723
(Del. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002).
93. See supra note 12 (discussing the validity of submit-to-vote covenants under
DGCL § 251(c)).
94. See Omnicare, 2002 Del. LEXIS 723, at *7 (remanding to Chancery "for the
entry of a preliminary injunction ... precluding the implementation of the
NCS/Genesis merger").
95. Id. at *6-7.
96. See supra Part II.A.
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principles is due in part to the fact that, as of the time this article went
to print, the court had not yet released an opinion elaborating the
basis of the decision. So, the Delaware Supreme Court has a lot of
explaining to do, but worse, there is good reason to believe that the
opinion that finally does emerge from the Court will not put these
issues to rest. The ruling was issued by a closely divided bench, which
voted 3-2 in favor of the order. Chief Justice Veasey and Justice
Steele refused to join in the ruling, and it is worth noting that Justice
Steel, before he was promoted to the Supreme Court, authored the
Chancery Court's opinions in IXC and Bartlett.97 As a result, the
Phelps Dodge/ACE, IXCIBartlett divide is likely to persist in the
issuance of the opinion and any dissent.
The NCS Order arose out of merger negotiations involving NCS,
Omnicare, and Genesis." NCS began its search for a merger partner
after changes in the level of health care reimbursements by the
government and third party insurers affected its viability as a stand
alone business. 99 According to the Chancery Court, this search led
NCS, through its financial adviser, to contact "over fifty different
entities to solicit their interest in a variety of transactions with
NCS." 1°
Over time, this field of potential buyers narrowed to
Omnicare and Genesis. After Genesis had submitted a proposal
which Omnicare had failed on numerous occasions to match, 1 ' NCS
entered into an exclusivity agreement with Genesis and began
negotiations on a draft merger agreement as well as draft voting
agreements with two shareholders, Outcalt and Shaw, who together

97. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
98. This recitation of facts is taken from the three Chancery Court opinions issued
prior to the Supreme Court's order. See generally In re NCS Healthcare, Inc.,
S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 19786, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2002)
(addressing the fiduciary duty claims), reversed by Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,
Inc., Nos. 605, 649, 2002 Del. LEXIS 723 (Del. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002); Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare Inc., et al., C.A. Nos. 19800, 19786, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 29, 2002) (addressing contractual interpretation issues); Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., et al., 809 A.2d 1163 (Del. 2002) (denying initial motion to
dismiss). Unless otherwise stated, references to the "Chancery opinion" hereinafter
refer to In re NCS Healthcare,C.A. No. 19786, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 25, 2002).
99. See In re NCS Healthcare,2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, at *7.
100. Id. at *8.
101. Id. at *18-19.
Although the two proposals are somewhat awkward to compare, due to
their different transaction forms, the Genesis proposal was clearly far
superior to the latest bid from Omnicare. First, the Noteholders were to
receive 100% of the face value of the Notes, rather than between 70% and
80%. Second, the stockholders were to receive approximately $1 per share,
as opposed to nothing. Finally, given the structure of the transaction as a
merger, rather than an asset sale in bankruptcy, the trade and other
unsecured creditors stood to receive full value for their claims.
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controlled a majority of the voting power of NCS common stock."1 2
Further negotiations led the NCS board to enter into a merger
agreement with Genesis and approve the Outcalt and Shaw voting
agreements," 3 notwithstanding an intervening bid by Omnicare, which
was considered and rejected by an independent committee of the NCS
board. 1 4

The merger agreement between NCS and Genesis contained a
submit-to-vote covenant and a no-talk provision as well as a
termination fee." 5 Although the no-talk provision included a
fiduciary out permitting the board to consider unsolicited bids that the

NCS board believed in good faith would result in a superior
transaction," 6 the out did not allow the board to avoid its obligations
under the submit-to-vote covenant. As a result, and given the Outcalt
and Shaw voting agreements, which assured shareholder approval of
the transaction once submitted to a shareholder vote,"7 the
consummation of the NCS/Genesis merger seemed certain. Omnicare
reacted by filing a lawsuit to enjoin the merger and launching a tender
offer for common shares of NCS."'

In rejecting Omnicare's challenge to the NCS/Genesis transaction,
the Chancery Court recited the rhetoric of the takeover cases and

102. Id. at *19. Genesis insisted on exclusivity as a condition of pursuing further
negotiations in order to avoid being made into a stalking horse for a deal with
Omnicare or any other bidder.
We didn't want to be someone who set forth a valuation for NCS which
would only result in that valuation ... being publicly disclosed, and thereby
creating an environment where Omnicare felt to maintain its competitive
monopolistic positions, that they had to match and exceed that level.
Id. at *15 (quoting deposition of an NCS advisor).
103. According to the Chancery Court:
After a thorough discussion of the July 26 letter from Omnicare, the board
concluded that "balancing the potential loss of the Genesis deal against the
uncertainty of Omnicare's letter, results in the conclusion that the only
reasonable alternative for the Board of Directors is to approve the Genesis
transaction."
Id. at *26 (citation omitted).
104. NCS considered the Omnicare bid in spite of its exclusivity agreement with
Genesis and, according to the Chancery Court, "concluded that discussions with
Omnicare ... presented an unacceptable risk that Genesis would abandon merger
discussions." Id. at *22.
105. See id. at *27-28.
106. See id.
107. The Outcalt and Shaw voting agreements provided, according to the Chancery
Court, that:
Neither Outcalt nor Shaw would transfer their shares prior to the
stockholder vote on the merger agreement; Outcalt and Shaw agreed to vote
all of their shares in favor of the merger agreement; and Outcalt and Shaw
granted to Genesis an irrevocable proxy to vote their shares in favor of the
merger agreement.
Id. at *28.
108. See id.
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seemed to apply the Unocal "reasonableness" standard," 9 which this
article has criticized as inappropriate in the context of negotiated
acquisitions.'
However, the ultimate outcome of the Chancery
Court-applying deference to board decision-making when the board,
acting through independent committees, engaged in a broad
solicitation of interest on the market for corporate control prior to
entering into a set of agreements that essentially guaranteed the
consummation of the transaction with a chosen partner-is consistent
with the account of deal protections advanced in this article. That is,
the Chancery Court, as it had done in Bartlett and IXC, permitted
strong deal protection provisions in the context of a market-tested
transaction."1 The importance of soliciting the interest of others in
the market was emphasized in the Chancery Court opinion:
After looking for more than two years for a transaction that offered
fair value to all NCS stakeholders, the board acted appropriately in
approving the Genesis merger proposal,
including the "deal
112
protection" devices demanded by Genesis.
Without an opinion, it is impossible to know precisely what the
Supreme Court found unacceptable in the Chancery Court's analysis
of the NCS/Genesis transaction or exactly how far the implications of
the NCS Order are to be taken. As noted above, however, there is
some indication that the majority of the court sought to apply
principles from the takeover cases that are, at best, contradictory and
indeterminate and perhaps completely irrelevant to the concerns that,
according to the argument of this article, ought to be guiding the
analysis. The practical implication of this analysis is that the
combination of a merger agreement containing a submit-to-vote
covenant with voting agreements aggregating a majority of the
target's voting power is illegal per se. While such analytics and
implications muddle the proper analysis of deal protection provisions,
one can perhaps take heart in the fact that there is likely to be a
strong dissent, written by Chief Justice Veasey or Justice Steele. As a
result, whatever opinion emerges from the NCS Order is not likely to
be the final word on the controversy, but is instead likely to bring the
debate surrounding the proper analysis of deal protection provisions,
at long last, to the attention of the Delaware Supreme Court.
III. PRIOR COMMENTARY
Prior commentary on the Chancery Court's deal protection
decisions has not produced a theory capable of harmonizing the cases
with each other or of situating them within established Delaware law.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at *54-60.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See In re NCS Healthcare,2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, at *54.
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The commentary instead focuses on outmoded or inapplicable
doctrinal paradigms. Commentators supporting enhanced scrutiny of
deal protections have centered their analysis on the duty of care's
requirement of informed decision-making, arguing that deal
protection provisions prevent target boards from becoming "fully
informed" and therefore violate the duty of care. By contrast,
commentators supporting business judgment rule deference for deal
protection provisions focus their attention on Delaware's change in
control paradigm, arguing that the deal protection decisions upset it
and warning that any doctrinal instability within this paradigm may
harm the deal economy. The commentators generally do agree on
one thing, however: Delaware's current deal protection jurisprudence
is inconsistent and wrong.
A.

Enhanced Scrutiny and Full Information

The interpretation that is most faithful to the Chancery Court's
language explains the deal protection decisions in light of the target
directors' duty to be "fully informed" when making decisions on
behalf of the company.' 3 A recent Note in the Columbia Business
Law Review argues that because no-talk provisions impede the flow
of information between targets and their would-be acquirors, they
should be strictly scrutinized and likely invalidated as an obstacle
preventing target directors from becoming "fully informed. 114
There is good support in both common sense and Delaware
precedent for the view that directors have not acted with sufficient
care if they have not informed themselves of the relevant facts in
undertaking a business decision."' The principle is illustrated nicely
113. The Chancery Court's "fully informed" rhetoric is most pronounced in Phelps
Dodge, where Chancellor Chandler repeatedly referred to the duty of a board to be
"informed of all material information reasonably available" and stated that "the
decision not to negotiate.., must be an informed one." Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *34 (Del Ch.
Sept. 27, 1999). To the Chancellor, the central offense of no-talk provisions was that
they "prevent a board from meeting its duty to make an informed judgment with
respect to even considering whether to negotiate." Id. at *4. In ACE, Vice
Chancellor Strine echoed the Chancellor's remarks on the "duty to make an informed
judgment." ACE, Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 109 (Del. Ch. 1999) (quoting
Phelps Dodge, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *3-4). The duty of a board to be fully
informed was also recited in IXC and Bartlett though neither of those cases found the
duty to have been breached. See In re IXC Communications, Inc., S'holders Litig.,
C.A. Nos. 17324,17334,1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999);
Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *19 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
114. Kimberly J. Burgess, Note, Gaining Perspective: Directors' Duties in the
Context of "No-Shop" and "No-Talk" Provisionsin Merger Agreements, 2001 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 431 [hereinafter Burgess, Gaining Perspective].
115. The relationship between a board's being "fully informed" and acting with
due care was noted by the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC.
The need for adequate information is central to the enlightened evaluation
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in the classic casebook decision, Francis v. United Jersey Bank,116 in
which Mrs. Pritchard, along with her two sons, inherited a directorship
in a reinsurance firm owned by her deceased husband. Sadly, Mrs.
Pritchard was a bedridden alcoholic, overcome with grief from the
passing of her husband, and as a result, never attended the meetings
of the firm's directors. If she had, she would have learned that her
two dastardly sons were looting the firm. When she passed away and
her sons' conduct was discovered, the court allowed recovery against
her estate for breach of the duty of care. That she was unaware of her
sons' conduct was no excuse, the court held, since as a director, she
had a duty to remain informed of the corporation's affairs, a duty17 that,
had she carried it out, would have led her to discover the fraud.'
Because the duty to remain informed is part of the duty of care,
however, one might expect it to be shielded by the business judgment
rule, which generally serves as a bar to suits for breach of the duty of
care. " ' Nevertheless, it is well established that the business judgment
rule does not apply to cases of gross negligence," 9 and it is possible, as
in Mrs. Pritchard's case, that not remaining minimally informed may
amount to gross negligence. The business judgment rule, after all,
shields rational business decisions from judicial second-guessing, and
it is probably not a rationaldecision, or at least not a rational business
decision, to consume several martinis before lunch and go back to bed
instead of attending one's board of directors meeting. Nevertheless,
in less extreme cases, the business judgment rule should apply to
insulate the good faith decisions of directors, including their decisions
in determining how much information to gather before setting out on
a course of action.
Becoming fully informed, however, has no limiting principle and no
end point. It permits judges to second-guess board decision-making
of a transaction that a board must make. This requirement is consistent with
the general principle that "directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior
to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably
available to them."
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted).
116. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
117. Id. at 826 ("[I]f Mrs. Pritchard had read the financial statements, she would
have known that her sons were converting trust funds. When financial statements
demonstrate that insiders are bleeding a corporation to death, a director should
notice and try to stanch the flow of blood.").
118. See Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Directors 110 (5th ed. 1998) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to establish a breach of
the duty of care first must establish facts sufficient to overcome the business judgment
rule presumption that the directors acted with due care.") (citing cases).
119. Id. at 111 ("Director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence
and gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business
judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one for purposes of
overcoming the business judgment rule's presumption." (internal quotations
omitted)).
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by finding fault with the amount of information gathered and may, in
the context of friendly acquisitions, be stretched into a requirement
that directors participate in an exchange of information-that is,
negotiate-beyond the signing of the merger agreement and
throughout the period between signing and closing. In fact, this is
precisely the position taken by those commentators most faithfully
applying the Chancery Court's "fully informed" language:
The execution of the merger agreement, where directors have
fulfilled the duty of care in the negotiation and decision to enter into
the agreement, does not signal a point at which the directors can be
relieved of this duty. Rather, the fiduciary duty of care to act on an
informed basis and in the best interests
of the company continues
12
through until stockholders have voted. 0
Once one accepts the logic of this position, it cannot be said, as
Chancellor Chandler has, that the duty to be fully informed does not
imply a duty to negotiate.12' The requirement that one be fully
informed is question-begging. Informed of what? The answer,
obviously, is other bids. And a care-based requirement that the board
entertain other bids would seem to imply that there is some bid that
the board would be duty-bound to pursue, which is inconsistent with
the existing Delaware change of control paradigm that implies no22
duty to negotiate in the context of a diffuse stock-based merger.
This tacit duty to negotiate would hold directors in breach of their
duty of care for failure to engage in discussions with unsolicited
bidders at any point in the merger process.
Although this approach is consistent with the Chancery Court's
rhetoric, it suffers from the fault of divorcing the court's "fully
informed" language from the real-world context of the merger
process, and indeed from any basis in common sense. Directors are
more than mere reporters or information-gatherers. Directors must
also make decisions and act for the benefit of shareholders. They
must, in other words, act as deal makers in the context of a merger or
other fundamental business transactions. However, interpreting a
duty to be "fully informed" to require discussions at any moment
between the signing and closing of a deal imposes constantly recurring
decision-nodes on directors, leaving them fundamentally unable to
make final decisions.'2 3 In Hohfeldian terms, this view of the full

120. Burgess, GainingPerspective, supra note 114, at 468.
121. See Phelps Dodge, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at *34.
122. See supra Part IL.A (discussing Revlon, Time Warner, QVC, and the current
change of control paradigm).
123. See also Brian C. Brantley, Note, Deal Protection or Deal Preclusion? A
Business Judgment Rule Approach to M&A Lockups, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 345, 375 (2002)
(advocating the application of the business judgment rule to deal protections
generally and noting that "[e]nforcing merger agreements (and lockups contained
therein) allows a board to effectively end the bidding process").
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information requirement emphasizes duty at the expense of power,'24

when Delaware law clearly requires directors to have both "powers

and duties."'' 25 Moreover, because no decision is ever final and no
deal is ever actually "done" until the shareholder vote, merger
126
contracts essentially become merger options until the deal closes.
This will reduce the value of the transaction to acquirors and target
shareholders alike, 27 causing some bids never to be made and

costs and delays associated with mergers
increasing the transaction
12
and acquisitions.

1

Finally, the "fully informed" rhetoric misunderstands the role of
information in the merger process. No-talk provisions are the single
most offensive deal protection measure under the "fully informed"

rubric because, the argument goes, they inhibit the flow of
information to directors, preventing them from learning about other
offers and rendering them unable to satisfy their duty of care. 129 But

no-talk provisions are not "no-listen" provisions. They prevent the
outflow of information from directors to prospective bidders, but they
cannot prevent the inflow of information from, for example, a bearhug letter or a voice mail message. Bidders can embed as much
information in these letters and messages as they choose, and indeed
124. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,. Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913). Following
Hohfeld, the corporation can be seen as a bundle of rights, duties, privileges, and
powers. In altering the relationship of the legal concepts in the corporate bundle, this
interpretation of the duty of care fundamentally alters the corporation.
125. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("[T]he powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed
to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation").
126. See Paul K. Rowe, The Future of the "Friendly Deal" in Delaware 1 (July 10,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
Rowe, Friendly Deal] (insisting that "Delaware is not an 'option' state; there is such a
thing as a real merger agreement").
127. See generally Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to
Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 27, 41 (1991) (discussing auction
theory in the context of takeovers and noting that "[p]ostauction negotiations create
the possibility of ex post opportunism and consequent ex ante welfare losses").
128. Merger negotiations are expensive for targets as well as acquirors, requiring
an investment of high level management's time and attention, advisory fees, and the
loss of interim business opportunities. Requiring targets to switch paths partway
through a negotiation and start over with another bidder only increases these costs.
Seen in this light, the premium offered by the intervening bid must exceed the cost of
additional negotiations-i.e., the additional commitment of management time and
energy, additional advisory fees, and additional foregone opportunities-in order to
justify its pursuit.
129. See Burgess, Gaining Perspective,supra note 114, at 470.
An aggressive no talk, which may prohibit the board from even speaking
with a third party, could prevent the board from learning about a potentially
superior proposal. Such a provision would block directors' access to
information which they are bound by their fiduciary duty to consider in
order to act in the interests of the corporation.
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they have an incentive, in attempting to persuade targets to break
their existing contract, to include precisely those items, such as price
and governance terms, in which the target directors are most likely to
be interested. There is nothing to stop the target directors from
receiving these messages, informing themselves, and passing the
relevant information on to their shareholders. No-talk provisions do,
however, operate to prevent directors from conveying information to
the bidder. In particular, no-talks prevent targets from sharing
sensitive financial information and other diligence materials with
bidders, information that is highly relevant to bidders in determining
how much the target company is actually worth and, therefore, how
much to bid. In other words, no-talks do not operate to prevent target
directors from learning about bidders but rather to prevent bidders
from learning about the target, thus creating a substantial information
asymmetry between the intended suitor and other would-be acquirors
and thereby increasing the financial risk of unsolicited bids. Rhetoric
that would require directors to be fully informed thus fails to
understand that the information-relevant party in no-talk provisions is
not the target, but rather prospective bidders.3
Targets can be
informed without talking.
The benefit of interpreting the deal protection cases along the lines
of the court's "fully informed" rhetoric is doctrinal clarity. It invokes
a familiar doctrinal category-the duty of care-that leads to a clear
doctrinal consequence: enhanced scrutiny. But what is gained in
doctrinal clarity is lost in subtlety and flexibility.
Formal
categorization is too crude a response to capture the complexity of the
merger process and thus threatens to compromise the flexibility of
corporate law jurisprudence in an area where subtlety and flexibility
are most needed.
In an effort to preserve this flexibility, other commentators have
advocated an ad hoc adoption of procedural checks on the target
board's use of deal protection provisions."' This recommendation,
130. In light of the direction of this information flow, arguments that no-talks
inhibit full information can, taken to an extreme, be read to imply that target
directors have a fiduciary duty to ensure that prospective bidders are fully informed
in order to preserve their incentives to bid. Taken to an extreme, in other words, the
duty to inform thus runs with the flow of information that no-talks seek to restricti.e., from directors to a universe of prospective bidders rather than to its own
shareholders. Such implications, which are clearly anathema to the change of control
paradigm and to Delaware corporate law generally, are a consequence of being
carried away by rhetoric.
131. Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing
Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. Law. 1609 (2000) [hereinafter Varallo & Raju,
Process Based Model]. The authors later modified their process based model into a
set of questions from which, they argued, an "optimal" standard might emerge. See
Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal Protection Devices:
Out from the Shadow of the Omnipresent Specter, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 975 (2001).
First, what is the specific measure designed to protect against, and how does
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unlike the more rigid call for enhanced scrutiny on the basis of the

target board's failure to remain "fully informed," is flexible and
therefore better suited to the fast evolution of corporate decisionmaking and the fact-intensive nature of Delaware jurisprudence.
However, in remaining resolutely atheoretical, it fails to resolve the
incipient doctrinal tensions which can lead to uncertainty and, in the
words of Vice Chancellor Strine, "categorical confusion.' 33 Unless
one is able to explain why the decisions come down as they do, there

can be no basis for predicting where the law will lead or which
provisions and procedures will be deemed acceptable. Similarly,
mandating process without an intelligible theoretical basis will
costs without increasing the value of the
increase transaction
34
outcome.

Regrettably, the recitation of familiar doctrinal categories, such as

the duty of care's requirement of informed decision-making, does not
supply a sound theoretical basis for understanding the problems
beneath the surface of the Chancery Court's deal protection decisions.
B.

Business Judgment Deference and the Deal Economy

Commentators on the opposite side of the strict scrutiny/business
judgment deference divide focus not on the duty of care, but on the
it relate to the rest of the agreement or agreements?
Second, what, if anything, did the board get in exchange for agreeing to this
provision or package of provisions and what process did it follow in agreeing
to the subject transaction?
Third, what is the effect of the provision on the ability of the board to
continue to gather information about the underlying transaction up until the
shareholders are asked to vote on it?
Finally, are the shareholders able to enjoy a meaningful and informed
exercise of their franchise without penalty or coercion implicit in their
vote... ?
Id. at 983-84. Although these inquiries may produce sensible outcomes in individual
cases, they do nothing to bring the question of deal protection provisions closer to a
coherent core principle.
132. See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997) (describing the fact-intensive
nature of Delaware jurisprudence).
133. See Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 53. Varallo and Raju explicitly
defer to the Delaware Supreme Court to resolve the uncertainty surrounding deal
protection provisions, offering their account merely as interim practical advice. See
Varallo & Raju, Process Based Model, supra note 131, at 1635 ("Given the support
for and problems with both the business judgment rule and the Unocal/Unitrin
standard for analyzing deal protection measures, certainty with respect to this issue
may have to await further decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court.").
134. Consider, for example, the surge in value (and cost) of investment banker
"fairness opinions" after the Van Gorkom decision. As courts and commentators
struggled to find the theory underlying the decision, practitioners rushed to the safeharbor of fairness opinions. See infra note 236 (questioning the value of fairness
opinions); infra note 269 (noting that the surge in the use of fairness opinions was not
long-lived).
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evolution of Delaware's change in control paradigm. They argue that
the deal protection decisions may undermine the doctrinal stability of
this paradigm, ultimately resulting in fewer deals.
Under the current change of control paradigm as it has developed
from Revlon through QVC, diffuse stock-based mergers, unlike cash
deals, involve no change in control and do not, therefore, trigger
Revlon duties.' 5 Because boards in stock deals are free to pick
merger partners for reasons other than short term share price
maximization, by implication, they should also be free to find strategic
merger partners without undergoing an auction where they must
negotiate with unwanted acquirors.
In the words of one
commentator:
Time-Warner was a promise to corporate America-you can do

strategic stock-to-stock deals without having to talk to everyone
who comes out of the woodwork. You can pick your new partner.
So long as the stockholders approve your deal, you can do your deal.
You will not lose control over your destiny. 36
The deal protection decisions appear to break this promise because
each case involves a stock merger and therefore no change in control,
yet in Phelps Dodge and ACE, the Chancery Court did not accord
traditional business judgment rule deference, but rather applied a
form of enhanced scrutiny. This has led some to suggest that the deal
protection decisions represent the creeping of Revlon duties into the
context of stock-based transactions, thus undermining the doctrinal
stability of the established change in control paradigm. 37
Apparent instability within the change of control paradigm is
overstated, and the threat of creeping Revlon duties is illusory.
Provided that the Chancery Court's expansive "fully informed"
rhetoric is avoided, 3 ' the deal protection decisions can be read in a
way that leaves the change of control paradigm completely
untouched. A careful analysis of the deal protection decisions reveals
that (i) judicial review of the merger contract is limited to a narrow
factual setting, (ii) judicial review of the contract, if triggered, is
confined to particular provisions and not the contract as a whole, and
(iii) any such review is premised on narrow procedural principles
drawn more from duty of care analysis than substantive duty of
loyalty analysis.
As discussed in Part VI below, judicial review of deal protection
provisions will only occur in the context of an otherwise
unconstrained last period problem. A last period situation increases

135. See supra Part II.A.
136. See Rowe, Friendly Deal, supra note 126, at 30.
137. See, e.g., Pat Vlahakis, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs: Is There a New
DelawareStandard?, 2 M&A J. 13 (2000).
138. See supra Part III.A.
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the structural likelihood that target managers have been motivated by
factors other than shareholder welfare maximization in their decision
to merge.139 It is very difficult to determine, after the fact, what their
motivations in fact were, and opening this question for judicial inquiry
threatens to greatly increase the scope of judicial review and
correspondingly narrow the business judgment rule. Fortunately, the
Chancery Court's decisions develop an alternate approach. As long
as the target's merger decision is subject to structural constraints, such
as the market for corporate control, the ability of its management to
defect from the goal of shareholder welfare maximization will be
limited and judges need not intervene. Only where there are no such
constraints, as in an unconstrained last period, do courts need to
intervene to limit the effectiveness of deal protection provisions. As
developed at length below, 14" a merger agreement protected by strong
deal protection provisions without a market check represents an
unconstrained last period situation, calling for some level of judicial
intervention.
Even if judicial intervention of the merger agreement is triggered
by last period considerations, the deal protection decisions reveal a
narrow scope of review, directed to particular contractual provisions
and not the transaction as a whole, thus leaving the business judgment
rule largely intact. Judicial review of a transactionis distinct from the
application of scrutiny to a contractual provision. Scrutinizing a
transaction to determine if it offers the best value for target
shareholders implies a consideration of all features of the contract,
especially the form and amount of consideration offered. The
examination of a single provision in the merger contract, however,
need not call into question the value of the transaction as a whole. A
court may declare a particular contractual provision void as against
public policy without opening the question of the value of the
consideration. If, for example, X Co. and Y Co. agree to a business
combination and include in their merger agreement a provision
requiring X Co. to burn down its competitors' factories, a court could
clearly scrutinize (and invalidate) that provision without examining
the consideration offered in the deal or the value of the contract as a
whole. 4 ' Similarly, even where the Chancery Court decisions imply
that judicial intervention is appropriate, such intervention is limited to
the deal protection provisions alone, not whether the contract as a
whole is likely to achieve the substantive end of maximizing the
consideration paid to target shareholders.'42
139. See infra Part IV.
140. See infra Parts IV-VI.
141. Indeed, drafters are well aware of this fact and typically embed in their
contracts a severability provision stating that if one provision is found to be void for
whatever reason the rest of the contract shall remain in effect.
142. Even when Revlon duties apply, Delaware courts generally do not compare
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Finally, the change in control paradigm is not implicated by the deal
protection decisions because, as a doctrinal matter, the change in
control paradigm is a form of duty of loyalty analysis, while the
narrow procedural considerations under review in the deal protection
cases more appropriately belong to duty of care analysis. As
developed at length below, the Chancery Court's review of a target
board's conduct in agreeing to deal protection provisions is procedural
rather than substantive. Setting aside the expansive reach of its
rhetoric, the court's stated concern is that deal protection provisions
render target boards uninformed in their merger decisions. Having
enough information to make a rational decision is an aspect of the
duty of care and may be thought of as a procedural aspect of the
merger decision. By contrast, the amount of consideration agreed to
in the deal may be thought of as a substantive element of the merger
decision. Substantive aspects of a deal are more often considered a
part of analyses of the duty of loyalty, which in its strongest form,
"entire fairness" review, requires an explicit weighing of the
consideration.'
The Chancery Court's decisions do not dwell on or
even seriously compare the consideration offered in any of the
competing transactions. Their analysis is limited to the target board's
decision-making process, not the outcome of that process. In this
way, the doctrinal ancestor of the Chancery Court's deal protection
decisions is Smith, not Revlon. As developed in Part V below, in
Smith, a duty of care analysis triggered by the absence of structural or
procedural constraints in the board's last period decision-making
supplied the grounds for judicial intervention. By contrast, in Revlon,
the rationale for applying enhanced scrutiny rather than the business
judgment rule was based upon a44duty of loyalty analysis and the selfinterest of the Revlon directors.
the consideration offered by one bidder to that of another. See infra text
accompanying notes 150-51. However, in such instances the courts' review of director
conduct is directed towards the substantive end of maximizing consideration paid to
shareholders. In the deal protection context, by contrast, the Chancery Court's
review of these provisions has not been directed towards the substantive goal of
maximizing consideration, but rather the structural goal of limiting the ability of
target management to make selfish and self-serving decisions. See infra Part VI.
143. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)
(describing the "exacting standards of entire fairness").
144. One of the reasons the Revlon directors preferred the deal of "white knight"
Forstmann was Forstmann's promise to restructure certain debt to relieve the Revlon
directors of personal liability to the company's creditors. See Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) ("The principal
benefit went to the directors, who avoided personal liability to a class of creditors....
[Wihere a significant by-product of [board] action is to protect the directors against a
perceived threat of personal liability.. ., the action cannot withstand ... enhanced
scrutiny.").
The court may have focused on this aspect of the directors' decision-making
because the duty of loyalty was (and is) a much firmer basis for adjudication than the
duty of care. At the time Revlon was decided, only a few months after Smith and in
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Once these features of the Chancery Court's decisions are exposed,
it is plain that any fear of doctrinal instability in the change in control
paradigm is overstated.
In the deal protection decisions, the
Chancery Court confined its review of merger agreements to a narrow
factual trigger, which, if activated, led to a review of a particular
provision and not the transaction as a whole. Thus understood, the
deal protection decisions raise procedural concerns, not a substantive
review of the merger transaction. In other words, Revlon should not
be seen to be encroaching on Time/Warner as a result of the deal
protection decisions because Revlon is simply not implicated by the
deal protection decisions.
Even if they do not upset the doctrinal stability of the Revlon-Time
Warner change of control paradigm, commentators warn that the deal
protection decisions will lead to fewer mergers because they imply
that targets may be unable to protect their deals. Just as the "Time
Warnerpromise led to [an] unprecedented level of merger activity,' '1 45
the deal protection decisions threaten to cause a decline in the
number of deals. Because corporations are extremely reluctant to be
put in play or to be forced into a situation where they must respond
to, and potentially accept, offers from uninvited bidders, the intrusion
of enhanced scrutiny into negotiated stock deals may cause boards to
think twice before entering into such transactions in the first place.
Fewer transactions may occur, and those that do occur may actually
be for a lower price if the bidder saves its reservation value in order to
respond to an overbid that never comes. 146 From this perspective, the
issue is simple: "does Delaware want to encourage mergers or not?' 1 47
The question whether a significant decline in merger activity would
result from the application of enhanced scrutiny to stock-based
transactions raises an interesting issue. Why should Delaware care if
there is a decline in merger activity?'4 8 Several commentators have
the midst of the fervor over that decision, the duty of care was less fully developed
and more controversial than the duty of loyalty. Then, as now, only the Smith
decision had ever imposed liability on directors for a violation of the duty of care.
145. Rowe, Friendly Deal, supra note 126, at 31.
146. See id. ("[H]ow many deals will be announced at less attractive exchange rates
for the side believed [to be] vulnerable to an overbid; so that the bidder can keep
some powder dry?").
147. Id. Whether limiting the ability to protect deals would lead to a reduction in
merger activity is, of course, an open empirical question for which data is not
available. The experience of practitioners, however, suggests that it would. In the
words of a prominent practitioner, "dozens" of transactions would not have been
done at all "if lawyers and bankers had advised boards that even [a merger of equals]
puts you (legally) in play" compared to a "handful" of deals in which alternatives
were not considered due to deal protection provisions. Id. at 31.
148. Theorists positing a race to the bottom may respond to this question by
arguing that Delaware should care if changes in its law lead to a decline in merger
activity because companies that want to merge without restrictions on their ability to
protect their deals will leave Delaware to incorporate in other states. As a result,
these theorists would answer, Delaware should care very much if changes to its law
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suggested that there is no reason to believe that the explosion of
merger activity in the mid-1990s was good for anyone, except perhaps
investment bankers, corporate lawyers, and a handful of top
executives. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary,
suggesting that the vast majority of deals were harmful to shareholder
welfare and that the shareholders of targets and acquirors alike
suffered as a result of the merger wave of the 1990s. 4 9 Is it really the
role of corporate law to facilitate socially wasteful transactions?
It may be, however, that the only thing worse than a regime that
facilitates wasteful transactions is a regime that permits judges to sift
good deals from bad ones and to block the bad ones as a matter of
law. Fortunately, the Delaware courts are acutely aware of this risk,
as evidenced by Chancellor Allen's admonition in his Time Warner
opinion that "[i]t is not part of the function of the court to evaluate
whether the ... deal is a good deal for Time shareholders or a poor
one"' 150 and the oft-repeated concern of making judges into "superThe deal protection decisions do none of that. As the
directors."''
next section argues, the Chancery Court's deal protection decisions
can be understood as a response to the structural risk that managers
and directors will serve themselves more than their shareholders in
the context of merger negotiations. This structural risk stems from
the management team's recognition that the merger of their company
with an acquiror places them in their last period of play, thus freeing
them from the influences that ordinarily constrain their decisionmaking and increasing the probability of self-serving decisions. This
account provides a theoretical framework capable of squaring the deal
will lead to a decline in mergers and, if so, should resist changing its law. See generally
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale
L.J. 663 (1974); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Texas L. Rev. 469 (1987). But see Daniel R.
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 (982); Roberta Romano, Law
as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, I J.L. Econ. & Org. 225 (1985);
Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L.
Rev. 709 (1987); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation,6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
149. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 Buffalo L. Rev. 249 (2001) (citing
studies that merger activity is harmful to shareholder welfare).
150. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Civ.A. Nos. 10866, 10670,
10935 (Consolidated), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *52 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989, revised
July 17, 1989) (Allen, C.).
151. See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, amended Feb. 14, 1989) (Allen, C.) ("To
recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance of business decisions for
'fairness' or 'reasonableness' or 'rationality' where those decisions are made by truly
disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of courts
super-directors."); Wanvig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 663-487, slip op. at 17-18
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 1.985) ("[T]he only alternative to the business judgment rule
would be to set judges up as super directors .... ).
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protection cases with each other and with existing Delaware
jurisprudence while avoiding doctrinal rigidity and preserving a robust
deal economy.
IV. THE LAST PERIOD PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF FRIENDLY
ACQUISITIONS

Corporate law generally accords a great deal of faith in directors to
manage corporations.'
Even stupid decisions will be protected by
the business judgment rule except in egregious cases of self-dealing,
fraud, duress, or illegality.'53 This freedom from judicial secondguessing, however, does not mean that corporate decision-making is
completely unconstrained. In most circumstances, directors' decisionmaking is subject to a number of significant constraining forces. The
last period of play is one notable exception.
A.

Mid-Stream Constraints

Freedom from judicial second-guessing does not mean that
directors are free to do as they please. There are a number of nonjudicial constraints on management decisions in the ordinary course of
business.
In the place of regular judicial supervision, the law places several
structuralconstraints on management decision-making, such as annual
meetings for the election of directors, regular reports to shareholders,
and securities law disclosure requirements as well as the constraints of
more general areas of law, including for example, agency,
debtor/creditor and criminal law. Moreover, the law is not the only or
54
even the main source of restraint on corporate decision-making.
Managers and directors are constrained by the mechanisms of various
markets, including product markets, capital markets, labor markets,
and the market for corporate control. In addition, most firms develop
an internal set of norms to limit the ability of managers and directors
to use investors' money foolishly or selfishly.
Market rewards and punishments provide an incentive for
managers and directors to act as wise and loyal agents of their
shareholders. In order to survive, firms must compete in product
markets, capital markets, labor markets, and the market for corporate
control. A firm whose managers consistently make foolish decisions
and whose directors are unwilling to remove or replace bad managers
152. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2002).
153. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1.976) (applying the
business judgment rule to a dividend decision that effectively cost shareholders $8
million).
154. See Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation,15
J. Corp. L. 377, 379 (1990) [hereinafter Thompson, Limits] (arguing that the ability of
parties to opt out of the corporate contract should depend on the effectiveness of the
"nexus of constraints" in the intracorporate relationship).
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will not be able to compete. It will not be able to produce its products
as efficiently or sell its products as profitably as its competitors.
Similarly, bad firms will have diminished access to capital markets and
will be unable to raise equity or debt financing on the same terms as
their more appealing competitors. Managers and directors also face
pressures from the labor market both inside and outside of the firm.'55
Inside the firm, labor market pressures arise from the ambition of
lower-level managers and employees who would like to have their
boss's jobs. Outside the firm, labor market pressures relate to the
ability of the firm to attract talented employees, who, given a choice
of employers, are less likely to select a consistently underperforming
firm. The pressures of product markets, capital markets, and labor
markets are likely to influence the business decisions of managers and
directors, forcing them to make good decisions for the firm or face
competitive decline and, ultimately, failure of the business. However,
these markets are less likely to prevent managers or directors from
behaving selfishly.156 A firm with good products and good earnings
may have continued access to product, capital, and labor markets
regardless of whether those earnings are actually paid out to
shareholders or kept within the firm to line the pockets of managers
and directors.'57
The market for corporate control, however, directly limits the
ability of managers and directors to usurp shareholder welfare.'58
155. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980).
156. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 839 (1981)
[hereinafter Gilson, StructuralApproach] ("The role of low-cost market mechanisms
in restraining managerial discretion is more limited with respect to management's
incentive to allocate itself an excessive portion of the corporation's income.").
157. Of course, if each of these markets is truly competitive, managers and
directors will not be able simply to usurp these cash flows. Instead, to the extent that
the firm's competitors reinvest earnings on research and development or expansion,
the firm will be forced to reinvest its earnings in order to retain its competitive
position. Managers and directors will thus be able to divert profits to themselves only
to the extent of their competition, who, facing the same competitive pressures, will do
so only minimally, if at all, preferring instead to use their cash flows to improve their
competitive position. That, at least, is the theory.
158. This has made it a popular subject for legal academics, following the insight of
Henry Manne. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112 (1965); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 3; Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 156,
at 841 (arguing that "where that favoritism is expressed in subtle ways, the market for
corporate control may be the only potentially serious force for limiting management
discretion"); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control. The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 6 (1983) (stating that the market
for corporate control "limits [management's] divergence from shareholder wealth
maximization"). But see James P. Walsh & Rita D. Kosnik, Corporate Raiders and
Their Disciplinary Role in the Market for Corporate Control, 36 Aca. Mgmt. J. 671
(1993).
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Assuming the market price of a stock roughly reflects of the value of
the firm's business, 15 9 the current market value of any firm reflects the
extent to which management diverts corporate resources to itself.
Other things being equal, the shares of a firm with selfless
management will be worth more than the shares of a firm with selfish
management, thus creating an arbitrage opportunity where all
selfishly run firms become potential targets. A firm that would be
worth $100 if run selflessly, but that is trading at $80 because its
managers divert $20 of shareholder welfare to themselves, will be an
attractive target to entrepreneurs and financiers, eager to buy the
company and get at that $20.60 Moreover, in a competitive control
market, the presence of other would-be acquirors will drive the price
of the target up to an amount close to its "selfless value." In the event
of such an acquisition, the target shareholders will be paid and the
former (selfish) managers and directors will be replaced by a team
selected by the entrepreneur/financier, who will be forced to run the
company more efficiently to justify the premium paid in the
acquisition and to service any debt obligations.161 The potential for
these would-be acquirors, even if no bid is actually made for the firm,
will pressure managers and directors to behave less selfishly, take less
of the firm's profits for themselves, and improve the firm's share price
or face replacement in an acquisition. 6 2 The market for corporate
159. That is, the value of assets as employed by the firm. Events in financial
markets over the last decade make this an increasingly dubious supposition.
Moreover, numerous financial economists have raised doubts regarding the efficient
capital markets hypothesis. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An
Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000) (collecting empirical evidence contrary to
the efficient capital markets theory). However, perfect stock market efficiency is not
required in order for the market for corporate control to have an effect on the
behavior of managers and directors. All that is required is a that a control market
exist and that potential targets believe that a firm's desirability as a target is related to
the skill and loyalty of its management team. This belief is demonstrated in the
statements of "raiders" and in the popular and academic literature. See, e.g., Clifford
G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six
ControversialInvestors, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 555 (1985); Carl C. Icahn, Icahn on Icahn,
Fortune, Feb. 29, 1988, at 54; T. Boone Pickens, Professions of a Short-Termer, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May 1986, at 75.
160. This amount will be less than $20 after transaction costs.
161. In this way, everyone benefits except the former managers: "Selling
shareholders receive more for their stock than its value under previous management;
new management receives an entrepreneurial reward through the increased value of
acquired shares; and society benefits from more efficiently used resources." Gilson,
StructuralApproach, supra note 156, at 842.
162. Companies that are "contestable" -less
protected by anti-takeover
provisions-are constrained by the control market in their day-to-day decisionmaking, while less contestable companies-companies with strong anti-takeover
provisions-are relatively insulated from the control market. See John C. Coates IV,
Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public
Corporations?,24 J. Corp. L. 837 (1999). Less contestable companies are constrained
by the control market only when Revlon duties apply and, as this article shall argue,
when they place themselves in a last period situation by agreeing to merge. In this era
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control, where it is operational," 3 thus provides an elegant constraint
on managers' ability to behave foolishly or selfishly.
In addition to the constraints of various markets, firms are likely to
develop their own norms to guide and govern the behavior of their
managers and directors. 1" Intra-firm norms are those rules or
standards enforced within the firm itself, not by a court or other
external rule maker. These include day-to-day items such as a firm's
dress code or credos165 and other elements of "corporate culture."16' 6
of anti-takeover provisions, would-be targets effectively re-enter the control market
by pursuing a transaction. That is not to say, however, that the duties of a target
board in the context of a friendly merger are the same as Revlon duties. The target in
a friendly merger can always abandon the transaction and remain independent, an
option that is not available under Revlon once sale has become "inevitable." See infra
note 286 (discussing the ability of a target to "just say no" and remain independent).
163. Firms adopting anti-takeover provisions, such as poison pills and staggered
boards, may be able to repel acquisition attempts and therefore not be subject to the
market for corporate control on an ordinary basis.
164. This account of "intra-firm norms" tracks the concept of non-legally
enforceable rules and standards ("NLERS") developed by Professors Rock and
Wachter. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1642
(2001) (hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power]. Rock and
Wachter advance a theory of the firm according to which the firm's boundary is
determined precisely by whether it is efficient to structure behavior according to
NLERS versus according to contract and third party rules.
[T]he [transaction cost economics] and property rights models provide a
foundation for a more comprehensive positive theory of corporate law. By
focusing on contractual incompleteness, this theory begins with the intuition
that the choice between intermarket and intrafirm transactions is the choice
between relying primarily on legally enforced contract, on the one hand, and
heirarchy, centralized management, and private governance on the other.
Id. at 1639-40. Although the account of deal protection provisions developed in this
article is consistent with the theory of the firm developed by Professors Rock and
Wachter, this article's account of deal protection provisions in the last period of play
does not rely on any particular theory of the firm.
165. See, e.g., Kelly Barron, The Forbes 400: Charlie's Pal, Otis, Forbes, Oct. 12,
1998, at 126 (characterizing a popular Warren Buffett credo as "When you've got a
good thing, don't sell it."); Owen Edwards, Form Follows Emotion, Forbes, Nov. 12,
1999, at 237 (describing Harmut Esslinger's work "to implement his credo: Form
follows emotion"). Such credos inform the business judgment of executives and
shape the business environment of the firm when implemented by management. In
the words of Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric:
Take an idea like Six Sigma. I'll throw Six Sigma out and say, "Here's my
vision." I'll exaggerate the case to create a sense of urgency, and I'll insist
that only the best people be assigned to work on it. I'll make these
pronouncements about every initiative over and over again. A relentless
drumbeat. Tens of thousands of people engage in the initiative, Six Sigma or
whatever, and I go to countless meetings and make it the focal point of the
session. Every meeting builds on the one before. At each meeting, we learn
what the great people in a particular business have done with the idea. Then
we go to the next stop. It's the people who keep enriching and expanding
the idea.
Harris Collingwood & Diane L. Coutu, Jack on Jack, Harv. Bus. Rev., Feb. 2002, at
94.
166. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Economics & Corporate Culture, in Handbook of
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More fundamental intra-firm norms include the firm's policies on
rewarding achievement (bonuses and incentive compensation) and
disciplining failure (demotion or dismissal), and can be seen to include
the very standards by which the firm judges success or failure.167
Intra-firm norms that seek to enhance the value of the firm, promote
sound decision-making, and maximize shareholder welfare may
discipline the board and management for mistakes and limit the
ability of individual directors and managers to serve their own
interests rather than the interests of their shareholders.
All of these constraints on managers and directors work together in
the ordinary course of business to guide decisions and discipline
mistakes. That is, they constrain managers in making the mid-stream
or mid-life decisions of a firm,'68 decisions including whom to hire,
what to produce, and whether to expand the business by acquiring
another firm.
B.

The Last Period Problem

The corporate form is perpetual,'6 9 but not all corporations live
forever. Some firms go bankrupt and some are bought and broken
apart or merged into other business entities. Under such conditions,
the ordinary mid-stream constraints of firm operation give way to last
period decision-making, and mechanisms that ordinarily constrain the
decision-making of a management team, including markets and intrafirm norms, no longer apply with sufficient force to deter foolish or
selfish decisions.

Organizational Culture and Climate (S. Cartwright et al. ed., 2001).
167. A firm can adopt norms that either enhance social welfare (such as the norm
of shareholder welfare maximization) or reduce it (such as norms that tolerate
slacking or self-interest); however, as with business decisions generally, competitive
markets should drive firms to adopt welfare-enhancing norms. See Rock & Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 164, at 1645 ("Unless competitive forces are
operating, there is no particular reason to expect NLERS to be socially efficient.
When markets are sufficiently competitive, a firm with suboptimal NLERS will be
driven out of business.").
168. The force of each constraint depends upon whether the enterprise is ongoing.
Markets will not punish poor quality when goods can be dumped into the market
once and for all. The threat of never receiving another loan disappears if the debtor
knows it will not ask for one. Intra-firm norms also require an ongoing enterprise.
For these governance arrangements to function properly, the ability to
punish opportunistic play is important, and the high-frequency, longduration interactions among the parties operating together inside the firm
allows ample opportunity to sanction bad play and encourage good play.
Similarly, frequent transacting also generates a high return for investing in a
good reputation.
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liasons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and InterdoctrinalLegal Transplants,96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 651, 666 (2002).
169. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(1) (2002) ("Every corporation created under this
chapter shall have power to [hlave perpetual succession by its corporate name, unless
a limited period of duration is stated in its certificate of incorporation ... ").
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The last period problem is a recognized phenomenon in game
theory and rational choice economics. 117 Cooperative undertakings
predictably deteriorate in the last period because participants are
more likely to pursue selfish objectives once they recognize that the
system of rewards and punishments favoring cooperation during the
life of the enterprise soon will no longer apply. In game theory, this
phenomenon is most visible in the final period of "social dilemma"
games, such as the prisoner's dilemma. 7' A cooperative strategy, such
as tit-for-tat, may emerge as the best strategy for an iterated
prisoner's dilemma game.' However, if the participants are told that
the next round of the game will be the last, the cooperative strategy
no longer applies and each participant has a strong incentive to defect
1 73
in order to maximize her individual welfare.
Less abstract manifestations of the last period problem abound.
Tenants commonly face last period incentives in connection with the
payment of their final month's rent, a problem that landlords seek to
solve by requiring rent payments on the first of the month and,
perhaps, an additional month's rent in advance. Employees face last
period incentives to slack when they know their employment is

170. See generally John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental
Research, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 142, tbl. 2.9 (John H. Kagel
& Alvin E. Roth eds., 1998) (summarizing results from studies by Isaac, McCue, and
Plott; Kim and Walker; and Isaac, Walker, and Thomas, showing that the incidence of
cooperation dropped from the 50-68% range in the initial period to the 8-19% range
in the last period).
171. The prisoner's dilemma, in which a prisoner must decide whether to cooperate
with (by remaining silent) or defect from (by confessing) the pact made with his
partner in crime, is one example of a collective action problem, a conflict between an
individual's own best interest and the interests of the collective entity or enterprise.
Other manifestations of the same conflict include "social traps," the "tragedy of the
commons," and "public goods/free riding" problems, all of which can be described
generally as "social dilemmas." See, e.g., Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural
Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 3 Advances in Group
Processes 51, 53-57 (1986) (noting the many names under which the general problem
of individual/group conflict may be described).
172. See generally Robert Axelrod & William Hamilton, The Evolution of
Cooperation, 211 Science 1390, 1393 (1981) (the strategy of tit-for-tat involves
"cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the
preceding move").
173. The last period problem may be abstracted to apply even to mid-stream
decisions since if players do not know when the last period will come, they may treat
each period as the last and defect from the very beginning. However, the empirical
evidence is strong that they generally do not do so. Cooperation often emerges in
mid-stream decision-making. See Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 Ann. Rev.
Psychol. 169 (1980) (seeking to explain the emergence of cooperation in social
dilemmas); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J.
Econ. Persp. 187 (1988) (collecting studies on the emergence of cooperation); David
Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Meta-*Analysis of
Experimentsfrom 1958-1992, 7 Rationality and Soc. 58 (1995) (compiling studies).
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coming to an end,174 and the sick or the elderly may face last period
incentives given the proximity of death." 5
For corporate managers, the most obvious last period scenario
involves bankruptcy and the looming failure of the business. As their
company fails, managers may react with desperation to save it and
themselves.1 16 Professor Rose-Ackerman has pointed out how the
approach of the last period may provoke increasingly risky investment
choices:
When a firm moves from expected solvency to expected insolvency,
the manager who only cares about survival shifts discontinuously
from the lowest variance project available to the highest variance
one. 177
This shift may favor negative net present value projects, provided
they entail a high degree of variance over low variance positive net
present value projects. Simply stated: managers facing collapse may
favor a one in a million shot at making enough money to save the
company over a more moderate project with stable cash flows. This
principle is illustrated nicely by the Tri-State Paving case, 78 in which
managers who had taken their company's remaining cash on a
gambling mission to Las Vegas defended their actions on the grounds
that the company was in such dire straights that risking the money on
the tables at Vegas was the best available investment alternative.'7 9
Another negative net present value project that managers in their
last period of play may consider is securities fraud. Professors Arlen
and Carney have shown that last period incentives may drive "fraud
174. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913, 1932 (1996).
Norms work least well when the power of future sanctions is eliminated or
reduced. This scenario most often occurs when an employer has a
reasonable prospect of going out of business. This raises the 'end-game'
problem and converts a relationship that is near termination from a repeat
game into a nonrepeat one.
Id.
175. See Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age 59 (1995) ("People keep promises,
obey the law, avoid shirking, and do other good things, economists assume, because
the prospective gains from doing them exceed the prospective loses. But what if they
have no prospects, because they are about to die, or, more realistically, their
prospects are truncated because of the proximity of death...?").
176. Managers lose their jobs when the business fails, as in a Chapter 7 liquidation,
and nearly as often, when it enters a Chapter 11 reorganization. See Stuart C. Gilson,
Management Turnover and FinancialDistress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 241 (1989) (finding
a 52% probability of a change in senior management associated with default); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1.25 (1990) (finding that forty CEOs in a sample of forty-three had lost their jobs in
Chapter 11 reorganizations before the bankruptcy plan was confirmed).

177. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment
Choice, 20 J. Legal Stud. 277, 288 (1991).
178. In re Tri-State Paving, 32 Bankr. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
179. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 177, at 290 n. 35.
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on the market" schemes.""1 In securities law, "fraud on the market"
consists of issuing false statements to increase or maintain the firm's
stock price.'
A manager's mid-stream incentives generally do not
favor committing fraud on the market because at some point the
statements are likely to be revealed as false, causing the paper gains in
stock price to vanish. Moreover, when the statements are revealed as
false, the manager is likely to be fired.18 2 Yet fraud on the market
occurs, Professors Arlen and Carney argue, as a result of the last
period problem:
[A]n agent generally will not commit Fraud on the Market so long
as his future employment seems assured. When the firm is ailing,
however, an agent's expectations of future employment no longer
serve as a constraint on behavior. In this situation a manager may
view securities fraud as a positive net present value project. Aside
from criminal liability, in a last period the expected costs of fraud
(civil liability and job loss) are minimal, while the expected benefits
of fraud may have increased. As remote as the prospects for success
may seem, these benefits include possible preservation of
employment as well as the value of the manager's assets related to
he is able to buy sufficient
the firm's stock, if by committing fraud
83
time to turn the ailing firm around.1
Managers facing the failure of their business may thus prefer to risk
lying to the market, potentially incurring legal liability, than to suffer
the immediate and certain consequences of the market's reaction to
the truth-that is, the further decline of their share price and
creditworthiness and the further degradation of their business
prospects.
Far from academic abstraction, these concerns can be seen to
motivate several of the recent accounting scandals, including Enron
and WorldCom.'84 Putting aside the apparent self-interest of Enron's
chief financial officer,', 5 the use of off-balance sheet financing
activities seems to have been directed towards the end of keeping
180. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J.Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691 [hereinafter Arlen &
Carney, Vicarious Liability].
181. See 9 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 4395 (3d ed. 1992).
182. If the lying manager was not removed, not only would the paper gains vanish,
but the stock would also likely trade at a discount for dishonest management.
Because the manager internalizes all of the risk of this activity (including liability for
fraud) and only a fraction of the gain (because she does not own all of the company's
shares), the cost/benefit calculus will generally disfavor the commission of fraud on
the market.
183. Arlen & Carney, Vicarious Liability, supra note 180, at 702-03.
184. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275, 1328-29 (2002) (noting, but ultimately rejecting, last
period concerns as the root of the problem at Enron).
185. See Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron CFO's Tie to a Partnership
Resulted in Big Profitsfor the Firm, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
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news of Enron's increasing losses from the market until a turnaround
in the company's fortunes occurred.8 6 The turnaround never came,
the financing activities revealed management as dishonest, and the
company failed. Similarly, the dishonest financial reporting of
WorldCom may be seen as management's attempt to conceal the
truth about a fast-failing company long enough for a market
turnaround (or an extension of credit) to save their jobs."8 7 Again,
they failed.
Another corporate law last period problem occurs when a company
is sold, as in a "bust up" acquisition. In the film Wall Street, for
example, Michael Douglas portrayed a prototypically loathsome
raider, proposing to buy Blue Star Airlines, auction its fleet of
airplanes, fire its employees, and use its pension fund to finance the
acquisition, thus plunging the fictional company into a paradigmatic
In such situations, ordinary mid-stream
last period scenario."' 8
constraints will not operate with their usual force and may not operate
at all. Blue Star managers and directors will be indifferent to product
market constraints because the firm, ceasing to operate as a going
concern, will no longer take products to market, indifferent to capital
market constraints because the firm will no longer need to raise
capital, indifferent to labor market constraints because there will be
no more hirings or promotions, indifferent to the market for
corporate control because control has already been wrested from
them, and indifferent to intra-firm norms because the firm will soon
be extinct. Faced with the destruction of the firm and, perhaps, the
end of their careers, directors and managers are freed from the
concerns that ordinarily constrain their decision-making and may
therefore be more apt to behave foolishly or selfishly.
Although the drama and hyperbole of a bust up acquisition is
typically not present in the context of a "friendly" merger-after all,
the business continues to operate and many employees keep their
jobs-last period features are still present at the level of the board of
directors and senior management, many of whom are likely to be in
the last period of their employment. In the context of a merger, the
last period dilemma of the target company takes place within the
management team."'Q Individual managers or directors may be
186. See generally Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2002, at B1 (quoting Professor Gilson on Enron: "Structured
finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile purposes. The problem is Enron
used it to create a structure that was genuinely not transparent, to hide things.").
187. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Lawyer Says WorldCom Ex-Chief Knew of
Improprieties, Wall St. J., July 12, 2002, at Al; Jared Sandberg, et al., WorldCom
Internal Probe Uncovers Massive Fraud,Wall St. J., June 26, 2002, at Al.
188. Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
189. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999) (arguing that managers and other
employees make "match specific" investments in a particular firm so that firm outputs
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brought aboard at the surviving company (or may be offered lucrative
"consulting" contracts), but the destruction of the team
notwithstanding the continuation of the business entity raises last
period concerns. Indeed, it may be impossible to look at the
composition of the board and management of the merged company ex
post and say whether last period incentives played a role ex ante since
some senior managers may be offered positions while others are not
and some directors may be invited to continue while others are not. It
may be that those who left acted in the best interests of the company
notwithstanding their individual last period dilemma while those who
were invited to stay faced no such dilemma. It may also be that those
who stayed would not have been asked had it not been for the impact
of the last period problem on their decision-making while those who
left faced the same last period concerns but lacked the negotiating
power to force their way into the continuing entity. 9 From the ex
post perspective of judicial decision-making, it is probably impossible
to say.
The last period problem thus exists as an ex ante structural concern
each time the management team of a target firm faces restructuring
following a prospective acquisition. Simply stated, although the firm
may continue to operate in product, capital, and labor markets, from
the perspective of the old management team, it is no longer their
company, and these are no longer their products. Therefore these and
other market constraints are no longer their problem.
The
constraining force of the target's intra-firm norms undergoes a similar
weakening with respect to the firm's managers and directors. The
combined entity will still have norms, but they will be new, the
product of a different corporate culture and management team. This,
if anything, is the truth behind the Time board's concern for the loss
of "Time Culture"' 91-that is, the fear that the norms of an
independent news organization supposedly focused on journalistic
integrity would be swallowed by the norms of an entertainment
conglomerate. 192 With the intra-firm norms of the independent target
coming to an end, the new norms of the combined entity are not likely
to constrain the crumbling management team. After all, these are not
their norms.
follow a model of "team production").
190. See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 503 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20,
2000) (Strine, V.C.) (noting, in the dismissal of shareholder-plaintiffs' allegations of
CEO self-interest, that the self-interest of officers and directors can be attacked for
agreeing to transactions in which they retain employment just as it can in resisting
transactions in which they lose their jobs).
191. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del.
1989).
192. See Friedlander, Kulturkampf, supra note 36 (describing "Time Culture" as
the legacy and vision of the company's original CEO, Henry Luce); see also James G.
March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 160 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the
motivational and cognitive aspects of culture on an organization's behavior).
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Because it simultaneously releases managers and directors from
their ordinary mid-stream constraints and increases the temptation to
enrich oneself at the expense of a dying corporation and its
anonymous shareholders,19 3 the last period signals a structural
dilemma in corporate law, a point at which managers and directors
have greater incentives to favor selfish objectives rather than the best
interests of their shareholders. In the context of a negotiated
acquisition, the target corporation's board and management may
demand side payments from the acquiror, thus effectively diverting a
portion of the merger consideration from the shareholders to the
management team. 194 If the management team is able to protect the
self-serving transaction with deal protection provisions, it will be
further insulated from the disciplinary effect of the market for
corporate control, leaving the outgoing management team free to
serve their own self-interest with relative impunity.
In addition to the unrestrained pursuit of their own self-interest,
directors and managers in the last period may depart from the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders due to a variety of
non-pecuniary, but equally selfish, motivations.
Directors and
managers may favor one deal over another because it is more in line
with their self image and view of the world or because it is more likely
to cause them to be remembered fondly by employees or the business
press. Neither of these motivations are necessarily consistent with the
best interests of the company and its shareholders. An analysis of
management and director behavior reveals several cognitive biases
that may contribute to sub-optimal decision-making in the last period
of play.
C.

BehavioralAnalysis of the Last PeriodProblem

Rational self-interest may account for a large portion of human
behavior, but probably not all of it. It is difficult to deny, after all,
193. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 164, at
1662 (stating "if one can get seriously rich, one can move to Aspen and ski for the rest
of one's days").
194. Most obviously, target directors and management could be interested in
keeping their own jobs. Lebovitch and Morrison emphasize the self-interest of
directors with the following hypothetical:
[A]ssume that the LMN board proposes a merger with a 60/40 equity split
favoring ABC's stockholders.
The LMN board, however, insists on
assuming full managerial control over the combined corporation and will
terminate ABC's directors and management. The XYZ board, on the other
hand, offers a 50/50 equity split, but plans to double the size of the board for
the combined entity, thus preserving the jobs of each director and resulting
in co-chief executive officers and co-chairpersons of the board.
.. [l]t is... possible that ABC's board has accepted the XYZ offer out of
self-interest.
Lebovitch & Morrison, Duck, supra note 51, at 13-14. Although they do not identify
it as such, the authors have offered a classic illustration of the last period problem.
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that people sometimes do stupid things.' 95 Recent efforts at providing
a more accurate and nuanced account of human behavior have
uncovered various cognitive biases which may lead to systematic
inaccuracies in perception and judgment.' 96 Among these are "selfserving bias" and "in-group bias."
Such biases may affect the
judgment of a management team at any time, but in the ordinary
course of business, several features-including structural constraints,
markets, and norms-limit the ability of management successfully to
operate under such biases. 97 As discussed in the previous section,
however, ordinary mid-stream constraints do not operate in the last
period. In the absence of these constraints, the last period signals a
time when otherwise common behavioral biases may lead to serious
deviations from the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders.
Self-serving bias involves selective information processing,
according to which a subject sees what it wants to see' 9s and
"conflate[s] what is fair with what benefits oneself."' 99 The existence
of this bias has been shown in numerous studies, including those in
which over 50% of respondents rate themselves in the top 50% of the
population in the possession of a desirable skill or trait2 ' and those
comparing spousal estimates of their portion of household work,
which typically sum to more than 100%.2"

195. See generally Bob Fenster, Duh!: The Stupid History of the Human Race
(2000) (citing examples).
196. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein, ed., Behavioral Law & Economics (Cambridge University Press 2000)
(collecting the works of various authors in the field).
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. See, e.g., John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in
Labeling Effects, 44 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 229 (1990). More than passive
"seeing," self-serving bias involves fitting what one has seen with what one has chosen
to believe.
People attempt to construct a rational justification for the conclusions that
they want to draw. To that end, they search through memory for relevant
information, but the search is biased in favor of information that is
consistent with the desired conclusions. If they succeed in finding a
preponderance of such consistent information, they are able to draw the
desired conclusion while maintaining an illusion of objectivity.
R. Sanitioso, Z. Kunda, & G.T. Fong, Motivated Recruitment of Autobiographical
Memories, 59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 229, 229 (1990).
199. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, II J. Econ. Persp. 109, 110 (1997) [hereinafter, Babcock &
Loewenstein, Impasse].
200. See, e.g., R.C. Baumhart, An Honest Profit: What Businessmen Say About
Ethics in Business (1968) (ethics); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 Acta Pscyhologia 143 (1981) (driving); Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 806 (1980) (health).
201. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and
Attribution, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 322 (1979).
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Self-serving bias operates as a kind of buffer against stressful
information.2 2 In situations of sufficient ambiguity,2 3 individuals will
interpret information that would otherwise threaten their worldview
or self-esteem as somehow inapplicable to themselves, leaving them
free to consider themselves good drivers and good spouses. In this
way, people tend to attribute their successes to skill and their failures
to bad luck or other external circumstances. 2 4 Self-serving bias is thus
linked to over-optimism. Optimism is not always warranted, of
course, and because self-serving bias causes individuals to shift their
attitudes and beliefs to be consistent with their positive view of the
world and themselves,2 5 it will lead to systematic errors in
j udgment.2 °6
Under self-serving bias, managers and directors will tend to conflate
their own preferences with the best interests of the company. The
empire-building CEO, for example, may favor deals that keep her
empire together. Managers who see their own roles as integral to the
success of the company may favor deals that preserve their jobs and,
blaming the company's poor performance on fickle investors or an
irrational stock market, spurn bids that do not represent their
overoptimistic appraisal of the company's "intrinsic value. '2 7 There
is no self-dealing in these situations. The managers are not taking
anything that shareholders should get. Managers and directors
laboring under the influence of self-serving bias favor choices that are
consistent with their view of the firm and themselves and, although
such choices may clash with the best interests of their shareholders,

202. See Jeff Greenberg, et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? Converging
Evidence That Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety-Buffering Function, 63 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 913 (1992).
203. If the situation is unambiguous, self-serving bias may not be able to interpret
away the stress of the information. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A
Behavioral Theory of Why CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause
Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 144 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort,
Organized Illusions] ("Self-serving inference is an anxiety buffer, not an anxiety
eliminator."): see also Hillel J.Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under
Ambiguity, 59 J. Bus. S225 (1986) (modeling decision making under conditions of
ambiguity); Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Risk, Ambiguity, and
Insurance, 2 J. Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1989) (applying the psychological model of
decision making under ambiguity to the context of insurance contracts).
204. See Miron Zuckerman, Attribution of Success and Failure Revisited, or: The
Motivational Bias Is Alive and Well in Attribution Theory, 47 J. Pers. 245 (1979).
205. See Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal 178-79 (7th ed. 1995) (using cognitivedissonance theory to show that attitudes and beliefs shift to support commitments
once made, thus preserving consistency).
206. This result of the "self-serving" bias begs the question of whether it would be
more aptly termed "self-defeating" bias. However, psychological research has shown
that self-serving bias may promote happiness, productivity, and mental health. See
generally Babcock & Loewenstein, Impasse, supra note 199.
207. For a discussion of Delaware's use of the "intrinsic value" concept, see infra
note 239.
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they do not necessarily further their own narrowly defined pecuniary
interests at their shareholders' expense.""
Some may object that self-serving bias, while it may infect a number
of respondents in psychological experiments, is less likely to motivate
the decision-making of firms because bias leads to errors and errors
will be punished by markets, including the firm's product and capital
markets.21 9 Putting aside the possibility that the business environment
is one in which self-serving bias and over-optimism are likely to
thrive,2 . it is worth emphasizing again the insight of the previous
section: that market constraints are not fully operational in the last
period.2"'
Thus, once a firm enters its last period, whatever
constraints markets and norms generally exert over the self-serving
biases of its directors and managers are likely to fail.
Overconfidence and optimistic biases may be compounded by the
group context of corporate decision-making. Management teams as a
whole may thus be susceptible to particular forms of self-serving
bias.212 As described by a leading commentator:
When a member brings up some information that suggests that the
group's decision making has failed to consider something troubling,
a threatening form of stress is introduced into the environment.
Without realizing it, each member is inclined to dismiss or ignore
danger signals, leading to less informed decision making that more
closely resembles collective rationalization than prudent choice.
Moreover, even if a group member privately wonders whether some
bit of information is troubling, the very fact that other group
members do not appear to be concerned is a reason to let the matter
drop,3 a process of social learning that has a dangerous circularity to
2
it. I

208. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities
Fraud,38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639, 655 (1996) ("Under ambiguity, the last period problem is
more likely to introduce a self-serving bias in the assessment of the firm's best
interests than deliberate disregard of them.").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 155-62 (describing the disciplinary force of
markets).
210. Employers want to hire optimists and occasionally design tests to evaluate the
level of optimism in prospective employees. See, e.g., Martin E. P. Seligman, Learned
Optimism 100-12 (1991). Moreover, in the words of one commentator, "there is good
reason to believe that the tournament-like competition for promotion up the
executive ladder overweights optimism and its associated behavioral traits, inflating
such behavior towards the top of the hierarchy." Langevoort, Organized Illusions,
supra note 203, at 140. In this way, the mechanisms of hiring and promotion may
cause one disgraced optimist merely to be replaced by another.
211. See supra Part IV.B.
212. See, e.g., Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusion, Disillusion, and the
Buffering Effect of Groups, 69 Org. Behavior and Human Decision Processes 103
(1997) (finding that "[aifter performing a task, groups typically hold positive illusions
about their performance while individuals hold negative illusions," and suggesting
that groups may serve as a buffer against post-performance disillusionment).
213. Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 203, at 138.
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In other words, group members may not bring troubling
information to the group's attention precisely because no other
member has already done so, and because all members face the same
incentives, the troubling information is likely never to reach the group
as a whole. This is the phenomenon known as "groupthink. '2 14 In the
context of a merger, groupthink may prevent independent directors
from challenging the decisions of a self-interested manager and from
questioning an accepted strategic vision or financial assumption.
In addition to exacerbating problems of self-serving bias, groups
may develop an identity and biases of their own, described by
Professors Cox and Munsinger as "in-group bias, 21 5 which leads to
judgment errors systematically favoring one's own group (the ingroup) over other groups (out-groups). Boards of directors may be
particularly susceptible to in-group bias due to several structural and
adaptive factors pushing them towards a high degree of group
cohesion. This process starts with the selection of directors, who are
chosen on the basis of their "fit" and their "probable identification
with and acceptance of the company's goals and methods of
operation."2'16 Because it involves selection to a cohesive and highly
prestigious social unit, board membership validates one's self-worth. 17
It thus inverts Woody Allen's neurotic reluctance at belonging to any
club that would have him as a member. 218 Being named a director
increases one's already high self-esteem. It is, in the words of one
219
commentator, "a little bit like being knighted.
Once this distinct unit is formed, in-group bias operates to cause
group members to identify their self-worth with the value of the group
214. See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (2d ed. 1982).
215. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law & Contemp.
Problems 83 (1985) [hereinafter Cox & Munsinger, Bias] (arguing that the biases of
directors, rooted in social and psychological drives, which equally infect independent
directors, prevent directors from neutrally evaluating shareholder litigation,
especially derivative suits).
216. Cox & Munsinger, Bias, supra note 215, at 91. Board members also choose
colleagues who are like themselves. The relative homogeneity of boards is well
documented.
See, e.g., G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (1967)
(concluding that upper class cohesion is based on cultural similarity); see also G.
William Domhoff, The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study of RulingClass Cohesiveness 103 (1974) (finding interlocking relationships between significant
social and policy organizations and the managers of large corporations); Thomas R.
Dye, Who's Running America? The Bush Restoration (7th ed. 2002). The spate of
stories in business magazines during the 1990s describing the twenty-year-old
wunderkinderin at the helm of significant American corporations seems to have
declined since the bubble burst and corporations have gone back to earning money
the old fashioned way.
217. Cox & Munsinger, Bias, supra note 215, at 94 ("Through attachment to a
group, especially one of high prestige, individuals satisfy their needs to validate their
self-worth, particularly by the group's feedback.").
218. Annie Hall (MGM 1977).
219. M. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality 88 (1971).
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and consequently to favor the interests of the in-group over the
interests of out-groups. This is not merely the rational pursuit of
group interest. Rather in-groups seek to magnify the differences
between themselves and threatening out-groups, even at the expense
of their welfare.2 2 ' That is, choosing the alternative that maximizes
difference rather than simply maximizing their own return.2 2'
In the context of management team decision-making, when
presented with an acquisition proposal, the influence of in-group bias
Unsolicited bidders are the paradigmatic
may be significant.
"threatening out-group." Especially when the bidder is an industry
rival, the groups will have spent years in competition, which may well
have bloomed into inter-organizational if not inter-personal acrimony.
To protect their own sense of self, which has become inextricably
bound with the group identity, managers and directors are likely to
resist combinations with hated rivals and unseemly financiers. Such
motivations form the background of numerous acquisitions, including
that of Revlon, where the court speculated that Perelman's repeated
based on Mr.
bids for the target were rebuffed "perhaps in part ' 222
Bergerac's strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman.
In-group bias further suggests that if cooperation does develop as
an alternative to individually motivated self-interest and defection,
the cooperation that does develop will likely be between the members
of the management team, 22 3 not between the management team and
220. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias, supra note 215, at 99.
221. See Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination, Sci. Am., Nov. 1970, at
96, 101-02 (showing that the strategy of maximizing the difference in welfare caused
competing groups to forsake profit-maximizing options).
222. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986).
223. The direction of cooperation is an under-appreciated aspect of social
dilemmas. Studies of social dilemmas often focus on whether self-interest or
cooperation are likely to develop under a particular set of conditions. Of course, the
presence of the experimenter (and an experimenter's agenda) can influence the
outcome. Dawes is sensitive to this issue, noting:
claims that cooperation results from the rewards accruing to individuals qua
individuals approach vacuity, given the standard instructions to subjects to
"get as many points for yourself as you can." Experimental subjects who are
cooperative with other subjects by foregoing dominating strategies are
cooperating with the experimenter by embracing them in order to maximize
their own payoffs.
Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt, & John M. Orbell, Cooperationfor the
Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience, in Beyond Self-Interest 100 (Jane J.
Mansbridge ed., 1990). The possibility of defecting within the prisoner's dilemma
game in order to cooperate with the experimenter raises the interesting question of
In the corporate law context, adopting the
who is cooperating with whom.
shareholder welfare norm, we would like the management team to cooperate with the
corporation's shareholders. However, the in-group bias suggests that members of the
management team are most likely to cooperate with other members, with whom they
have developed group cohesion and to whom they have bound their self-image. Ingroup cooperation has no necessary connection to shareholder welfare, and the two
may be expected occasionally to coincide and occasionally to conflict. In other words,
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its shareholders, another out-group, who are at best passive and
anonymous and at worst interfering institutional investors demanding
excessive inclusion in the internal affairs of the corporation.22 4 In the
last period of play, whether it is in the context of bankruptcy or
merger, it is precisely this in-group that is destroyed. Because the
management team, through in-group bias, has developed norms of
loyalty, cohesion, and mutual support,2 25 it is likely that its decisionmaking in the last period will reflect deference to its own members
rather than concern for the firm's shareholders, deference which may
extend to the CEO's choice of a merger partner.
Recognized cognitive biases, including self-serving bias, overoptimism, and in-group bias, are exacerbated in the last period of play
because none of the ordinary constraints on management team
behavior apply to punish mistakes. Combined with the greater risk of
crass self-interest in the last period, these biases cast serious doubt on
the faith that one can put in the last period decision-making of
corporate boards. Simply stated: last period decisions are structurally
less likely to be good for the corporation and its shareholders than
mid-stream decisions.
V. DELAWARE'S RESPONSE TO THE LAST PERIOD PROBLEM: THE
CASE OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

When ordinary mid-stream constraints apply to limit the ability of
managers and directors to defect from the best interests of their
shareholders, courts can confidently apply the business judgment rule
and avoid intervention in the internal affairs of the corporation. 226 As
the last section has shown, however, under the shadow of the last
period, managers and directors are less likely to be adequately
constrained by this incentive structure. Instead, the last period
problem ushers in an opportunity for management team defection and
shareholder exploitation. How then, should courts respond to the
issues raised by the predictable collapse of restraints in the last
period?
members of the management team may occasionally choose to cooperate with other
members of the management team by defecting from the interests of shareholders.
224. See, e.g., Panel: The Institutional Investor's Goals for Corporate Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 Del. J. Corp. L. 35 (2000) (announcing a corporate
governance agenda from the perspective of institutional investors).
225. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias, supra note 215, at 99 (arguing that "powerful
psychological factors are at work within the boardroom, creating a cohesive, loyal,
conforming ingroup that will support its members for positive and negative reasons,
under low and high levels of motivation and group values").
226. See Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 164, at 1671-86
(reviewing business judgment rule cases and finding that courts were likely not to
apply the business judgment rule in situations where NLER-governance could be
expected to fail); Thompson, Limits, supra note 154, at 390 ("Fiduciary duties become
important when the temptation to advance personal gain is high and the threat of
discipline from other sources is low.").
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The answer of the Delaware Supreme Court, though poorly
communicated and often misunderstood, is sketched by the case of
Smith v. Van Gorkom.227
Smith arose as a result of the efforts of Jerome Van Gorkom, the
Chairman and CEO of Trans Union, to sell the company. Because it
contained certain non-transferable tax assets that it could not use as a
free standing entity and because it generated cash flows large enough
to sustain high levels of debt, 22 ' Trans Union was a natural acquisition
candidate. Having worked out a rough estimate of what the
company's shares might be worth in a deal, Van Gorkom approached
buy-out specialist Jay Pritzker of the Marmon group to solicit his
interest in the company.229 Pritzker responded with an offer for the
company at exactly the price Van Gorkom had estimated the shares
to be worth, a premium of roughly 50% over the current market price,
and gave the company only three days to decide. 23 At a hastily
convened board meeting, after two hours of unusually intense
questioning, 3 ' Trans Union's directors accepted the outline of the
proposal as the exact details of the merger agreement were still being
worked out by the company's lawyers.232 The board, however,
required that the company be permitted to consider other offers,
emphasizing that their approval of the Pritzker merger was intended
only to bring the offer before Trans Union's shareholders, not to seal
the deal.233
In what is generally regarded as an unfortunate decision,3 the
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that this seemingly casual
process amounted to a breach of the Trans Union directors' duty of
care. 2 5 The court then went on to note a number of procedural
mechanisms, including reliance on an investment bank's fairness
227. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
228. Id. at 864.
229. Id. at 866-67. Van Gorkom determined that a price of $55 per share would be
acceptable. From 1975 to 1979, Trans Union stock traded over the New York Stock
Exchange between $24 1/4 and $39 1/2. Id. at 866 & n.5.
230. Id. at 867.
231. One director referred to the meeting as "one of the most questioning meetings
we ever had." William M. Owen, Autopsy of a Merger 70 (1986).
232. Smith, 488 A.2d at 868-69.
233. See id. at 869.
234. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush:
Why Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 631, 631 (2002)
("Considered a legal disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.") (citations,
noting criticisms of the decision, omitted).
235. Smith, 488 A.2d at 893.
[W]e hold that the directors of Trans Union breached their fiduciary duty to
their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend
the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material
information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in
deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.
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opinion, 236 that, if present, would have made it more inclined to find
that the duty had not been breached. In this way, Smith is generally

read as an aberration in Delaware's duty of care jurisprudence. The
more interesting aspects of the case, however, relate to the court's
approach to deal protection provisions in a last period context.

Van Gorkom, at the age of sixty-three, was within two years of
mandatory retirement at Trans Union and was thus in the last period
of his employment with the company.2 37 Whatever happened to Trans

Union five years hence, Van Gorkom would not be involved. He was
therefore less susceptible to ordinary mid-stream constraints on his
decision-making.238 In addition, as a large shareholder of Trans Union
stock, Van Gorkom's limited future association with the company and
pending retirement may have altered his time horizon and risk
preferences. It was possible, after all, that changes in the tax law or
the capital markets would cause the value of Trans Union stock to rise
to its "intrinsic value" at some point in the future.239 If that point was
ten to twenty years away, Van Gorkom might not be alive to see it,
yet here he was presented with a 50% premium over the stock's ten

year trading range. In this way, given a relatively short time horizon,
one might expect someone in Van Gorkom's place to be quite
receptive to an offer of $55 cash in hand rather than the riskier
236. Viewed in isolation, each of the court's procedural mechanisms is easily
discredited. The court suggested that the board should have read the draft merger
agreement. But does the court really believe that board members closely examine the
turgid legalese of lengthy agreements? A more sensible approach would be for the
company's inside and outside advisers to work on the details of the documents and
for the board to exercise decision-making authority over the key terms, which indeed
is how the procedure was handled at Trans Union. See id. at 868-69. Moreover, the
fairness opinion aspect of the decision has been so widely and ably criticized-as "the
Investment Bankers' Full Employment Act"-that it is hardly necessary to add
anything on that point. See Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, CorporateDirectors,
CorporateRealities and DeliberativeProcess:An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11
J. Corp. L. 311, 333 n.146 (1986) (noting the reaction of New York professionals to
the Smith decision). Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court later revealed skepticism
of its own regarding fairness opinions when it realized that bankers occasionally
brought blank opinions to board meetings, with the price term to be filled in later,
once the board had decided what it wanted the price to be. See Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
237. This fact did not escape the Delaware court: "It is noteworthy.., that [Van
Gorkom] was then approaching 65 years of age and mandatory retirement." Smith,
488 A.2d at 866.
238. See supra Part IV.
239. The court discusses the "per share intrinsic value" of Trans Union stock. See
Smith, 488 A.2d at 866. For commentary on the concept of "intrinsic" or "hidden"
value and Delaware's implicit departure from the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
see, for example, Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law:
The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521 (2002); John C. Coates
IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 (1999); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, A
Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 595 (2002); Macey & Miller, supra note 148.
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propositions of remaining independent and never reaching the $55
level, or rejecting the $55 bid to pursue other bids that might never
arise. These changes in Van Gorkom's incentives brought on by the
recognizable approach of the last period were noted in the business
press at the time: "[b]ecause Mr. Van Gorkom at age 63 is
approaching retirement, insiders suspect he would rather sell out than
at this late stage take on the challenge of restructuring the
' .
company."24
But Van Gorkom was not the only player facing last period
incentives. Because the most feasible way for Trans Union to profit
from its tax position was through an acquisition, and the company's
high cash flows made it an attractive target for a highly leveraged bust
up deal, other senior managers might also have realized that they
were in the last period of their employment or, at the very least, that
the Trans Union management team would soon face substantial
change. The last period problem suggests that such actors will be less
constrained by the mid-stream incentive structure that might
otherwise prevent them from acting in their own self-interest.24 1 And
indeed, the other members of Trans Union senior management
formed their own group to acquire the company with the help of the
242
buyout firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., or "KKR.
Management buyouts, as Van Gorkom himself was well aware,243 can
involve a conflict of interest between the management team, which
will seek to pay as little as possible for the company, and
shareholders, who desire to be paid as much as possible for their
shares. Although there are procedural mechanisms for mitigating
such conflicts,244 the interests of senior managers in their own deal
may have tainted their view of other transaction proposals. Indeed,
anecdotal accounts of the situation inside Trans Union suggest that
many managers were motivated to preserve their positions, operating
units, and employees rather than to maximize shareholder value.245
240. Herbert Greenberg, Behind the Turmoil at Trans Union, Crain's Bus. Daily,
Jan. 12, 1981, at I.
241. See supra Part IV.
242. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 884 ("In late September, [the] group contacted KKR
about the possibility of a leveraged buy-out by all members of Management, except
Van Gorkom.").
243. See id. at 865 (stating the basis of Van Gorkom's opposition to the
Management buy-out as the "potential conflict of interest for Management").
244. See Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s,
Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96
Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 612 (2002) (noting that "an independent board of directors can
intercede to negotiate against management on behalf of the shareholders").
245. Owen describes the position of Jack Kruizenga, manager of Trans Union's
tank car leasing operation, the company's most profitable business unit, as follows:
"The Pritzker operations were unknown entities, and Kruizenga and his people were
deeply concerned about their future as employees. His comments were not about
stockholder concerns. Instead, his focus was on the employee situation." Owen,
supra note 231, at 88. Owen describes the view of another Senior Vice President who
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Because last period constraints on the behavior of managers and

directors are predictably weak when compared to other incentives,
such as personal enrichment and job preservation,246 one might expect
managers and directors to stop serving the firm's or shareholders'
interests in favor of their own. Although there were no accusations of
self-dealing,247 Van Gorkom may have been motivated to sell to
Pritzker in order to cash in his shares according to his now shortened
time horizon.248 Similarly, other members of the management team
may have pursued the management buyout in order to preserve their
own positions and serve their own interests within the company. If
management teams serve their own interests and insulate their own
decisions, as expressed in the merger agreement, from the market for
corporate control, their shareholders will be worse off. This was the

threat embodied in the Trans Union/Marmon Group merger
agreement.
As initially negotiated, the merger agreement between Trans Union
had joined the buyout group that "the company had obligations to its employees, its
customers, and its shareholders-and that the employees clearly came before the
shareholders in his order of priorities." Id. at 92. And Sidney H. Bonser, an
Executive Vice President and director of Trans Union, is said to have openly voiced
his concerns regarding his future employment with the company, while other
executives appeared to be in a "stupor" and were "deeply shaken and disheartened."
See id. at 68.
246. See supra note 194.
247. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 873 ("Here, there were no allegations of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof.").
248. The economic facts surrounding the case suggest that Van Gorkom may
indeed have gotten the best value any Trans Union shareholder could have hoped for
from her shares. By the time the deal closed, the five year projections for the
profitability of the acquired businesses, which were essential in order to service the
massive acquisition debt, were proven optimistic as a result of skyrocketing interest
rates. In the words of Jay Pritzker:
[U]nfortunately, [the five-year projections] were not very reliable, primarily
because interest rates have climbed so considerably since that time, which
perhaps one could not have anticipated. As a result, it has an impact, a
substantial impact, on earnings and a substantial impact on the ability to
divest some of the divisions that [we] anticipated we would divest....
Owen, supra note 231, at 200 (quoting the testimony of Jay Pritzker). Corroborating
these comments, Trans Union's interest expense had risen 46% in 1980 as a result of
rising interest rates, depressing the company's previously strong cash-flow as a greater
share of revenue was used to service increasingly expensive operating debt. See id.
Of course, the fact that ex post, the company's actions benefited shareholders
does not mean that ex ante, the company's primary interest was in maximizing
shareholder welfare. Hindsight bias, in this case, makes Van Gorkom's financial
decision appear to be quite good, but that does not mean the decision was not made
as a result of last period influences. Perhaps a manager with a different time horizon,
seeing that the escalation in interest rates was preventing a serious $60 bid from being
made, would have decided to reject the Pritzker merger agreement and table future
negotiations until interest rates returned to a more reasonable level. Of course, who
knows when interest rates would come down, maybe next month, maybe next year,
maybe never, but Van Gorkom clearly did know that other bidders would be
interested in Trans Union under the right financial conditions. His time horizon may
have made him disinclined to wait for those financial conditions to resurface.
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and the Marmon Group contained strong deal protections, including
terms that were functionally similar to today's termination fee, noshop, and no-talk provisions. The sale of one million Trans Union
shares to Pritzker at a price just above the then-current market price
functioned as a kind of termination fee. If Trans Union was sold to
another bidder, the new acquiror would also be forced to buy these
shares, thus incurring an additional cost to its bid and paying Pritzker
for serving as a "'stalking horse."'249 The merger agreement also
contained a relatively straightforward no-shop provision, which
purported to limit the ability of Trans Union actively to solicit other
offers but which permitted Trans Union to consider other offers if
made."'
Finally, as originally drafted, the merger agreement
contained a provision that would have prevented Trans Union from
This
sharing non-public information with competing bidders."'
provision thus functioned as a no-talk provision, limiting the amount
of diligence information that prospective bidders would be able to
gather on the company, thereby creating a substantial information
asymmetry between the Marmon Group and future bidders.252
Ultimately, however, none of these provisions would present a
major obstacle to an intervening bidder. The no-shop and no-talk
provisions did not survive. The no-talk provision was removed before
the definitive merger agreement was signed as a result of the board's
objection to it at the initial (two hour) board meeting. Similarly,
although the no-shop provision was incorporated into the merger
agreement, it was later amended to permit the company actively to
solicit competing bids, and Trans Union hired Salomon Brothers to do
so. 53 Moreover, the only deal protection provision that did survive
through to the consummation of the merger-the termination feewould not now be seen as preclusive. Although the million shares
sold to Pritzker upon signing the deal would represent a substantial
profit to the Marmon Group if Trans Union were to be acquired by
another bidder,5 as a percentage of deal value, the cost of buying out

249. Smith, 488 A.2d at 866. In the further words of Jay Pritzker:
[I]f all we did was make an offer at $55, and were left naked with that offer,
what we would have done is kicked off an auction contest at great expense
to ourselves, the expense being substantial commitment fees for financing,
substantial legal fees, substantial lost opportunity cost at no recompense,
and then someone else could have come out and said well, we'll pay $55.10.
Owen, supra note 231, at 60-61.
250. Smith, 488 A.2d at 868-69.
251. See id. at 869.
252. See supra text accompanying note 13.
253. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 869-70.
254. If, for example, another acquiror bought Trans Union for $55 per share,
Pritzker's profit from the one million shares would be $17 million. Ifanother
acquiror bought Trans Union for $60, the profit on those shares would equal $22
million.
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the shares never exceeded 3%,255 a percentage that is well within the
range of termination fees typically deemed acceptable by the
Delaware courts.256 Thus, none of the deal protection provisions
initially drafted in the merger agreement had the effect of insulating
the deal from the market for corporate control.
Nevertheless, the court spends considerable time analyzing the
validity of the market check and finally concludes that the Trans
Union/Marmon Group merger agreement never received an adequate
market test.25 7 Moreover, the court was probably correct in this
conclusion. In spite of Salomon Brothers' efforts, canvassing over 100
prospective bidders,258 only two serious contenders emerged: GE
Capital and the management buyout proposal, backed by KKR. A
handful of other prospective bidders expressed interest,25 9 but these
expressions ultimately came to nothing, as did discussions with KKR
and GE Capital. When the solicitation period ended, there was only
one merger proposal remaining: Pritzker's. If the economics of the
acquisition were so appealing--essentially buying tax credits and
paying for them with debt serviced by the target's large cash-flowwhy did no other serious proposals emerge? Answer: it's the
economy, stupid.
The prime lending rate was 7.5 percentage points higher in
February 1981, when Trans Union's shareholders approved the Trans
Union/Marmon Group merger agreement, than it had been in
September 1980, when was the agreement was signed. In fact, interest
rates had climbed to an all time high during the period of the market
test. This unprecedented escalation in interest rates is detailed in
Table 1.

255. See Owen, supra note 231, at 51-53, 120-22.
256. Seesupra note 11.
257. Smith, 488 A.2d at 878 ("[T]he directors had no rational basis for expecting
that a market test was attainable, given the terms of the Agreement.").
258. See Owen, supra note 231, at 122.
259. See id. at 190-91 (noting that apart from KKR and GE Capital, Trans Union
executives met with only three potential suitors-Borg Warner, Bendix, and
Genstar-all of whom dropped out of the auction process without making a serious
bid).
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Table 1: CHANGES INTHE PRIME RATE, SEPTEMBER 1980 THROUGH
FEBRUARY 1981.26
Date
9/1/80

Rate
11.5%

Date
11/21/80

9/8/80

12%

11/26/80

17.75%

9/12/80
9/19/80
9/26/80
10/1/80
10/17/80
10/29/80

12.25%
12.5%
13%
13.5%
14%
14.5%

12/2/80
12/5/80
12/10/80
12/16/80
12/19/80
1/2/81

18.5%
19%
20%
21%
21.5%
20.5%

11/6/80
11/17/80

15.5%
16.25%

1/9/81
2/3/81

20%
19.5%

Rate
17%

One effect of this jump in interest rates was to increase the cost of
capital for Trans Union's prospective bidders. Having received its
loan commitments in September, the Marmon Group was effectively
guaranteed a much less expensive source of financing than any rival

bidder could hope for. Indeed, the most serious rival proposal to
acquire Trans Union, the KKR-backed management bid, collapsed on
multiple occasions as a result of its inability to secure financing.2 6'
With rising interest rates, the income of the company would have to

be increasingly robust in order to service the debt. Unfortunately, the
surge in interest rates also reduced Trans Union's vaunted net income
as more of the company's cash flow was directed towards operating
debt.262 As a result, parties interested in bidding for Trans Union

would have found such an acquisition increasingly expensive.
Moreover, the Marmon Group would have a significant competitive
advantage in any bidding contest as a result of the interest rates it had
previously locked. Because Pritzker had received the majority of his
loan commitments in September and October of 1980, including a
$450 million loan at 14%,263 they would have to borrow less at
prevailing rates in subsequent rounds of bidding than competing
bidders. 2' Aware that they were dealing with a competitor with
260. Data taken from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Archive of the
Daily Prime Rate, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hI5/data/
d/prime.txt (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). A similar table appears in Owen, supra note
231, at 128.
261. See Owen, supra note 231, at 133-34, 179-83,187-88.
262. Trans Union's net income dropped 30% in the last quarter of 1980. Id. at 188.
263. See id. at 196-97.
264. If, for example, a rival bid of $60 per share was put together on December 10,
1980, it would have been less expensive for the Marmon Group to match it than it
would have been for the rival bidder to make it. Assuming both bids are based on
80% leverage, Marmon's blended interest rate for $602 million (roughly 80% of the
total acquisition price) would have been approximately 15.5% ($450 million at 14%
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significantly lower cost of capital, prospective bidders may have
simply decided not to bother waging an extremely expensive bidding
war that they were likely, ultimately, to lose. The escalation in
interest rates and the concomitant impact on the cost of acquisition
capital thus provided greater protection for the Trans Union/Marmon
Group merger agreement than its relatively weak deal protection
terms.
Because a contestable market for corporate control not only
ensures that shareholders receive the greatest value for their shares,
but also limits the ability of managers and directors to serve their own
interests in the last period,265 the court was right to focus on the
validity of the market test. If the market is not effectively contested,
managers and directors may exploit shareholders and serve their own
interests instead. It is unclear whether the Trans Union management
team did in fact neglect their shareholders in favor of their own
interests, but it is clear that they were facing last period incentives. It
is also clear that the merger agreement produced under these last
period incentives was effectively insulated from the constraining
influence of the market for corporate control. If the market for
control of Trans Union had been functioning adequately, the court
could have accepted the directors' contention that the best deal
won. 26 6 Without a properly functioning market, however, the court
could not know whether the Pritzker deal reflected the best deal for
26
shareholders or the management team's last period problem. 1
The unfortunate aspect of the decision is that the court blamed the
Trans Union directors for bad economic conditions, the antithesis of
good business judgment rule jurisprudence.
If the market for
corporate control had been functional, then the actions of the Trans
Union directors would have been appropriate. However, that the
market for corporate control was not functional was no fault of the
Trans Union directors. The deal protection provisions embedded in
the final draft of the merger agreement were relatively weak. The
failure of the market for corporate control was, rather, a result of
escalating interest rates. The directors intended to test their deal on
and $152 million at 20%) compared to the rival bidder's interest rate, drawn entirely
from prevailing rates, at 20%. As a result rival bidders would have to value Trans
Union significantly more than Marmon (or be significantly more optimistic about its
future cash flows) in order to enter a bidding contest at such a disadvantage.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
266. KKR and the management group, after all, were trying to assemble a bid at
$60 per share. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985). It does not take
much economic analysis to see that $60 is better than $55 just as surely as $55 is better
than $38.
267. Following the oft-recited justification for the business judgment rule, courts
cannot know whether a particular deal is best. A judge, even a Delaware Chancellor,
can never be in the position of a director acting in good faith ex ante, and judicial
scrutiny of deal-making suffers from hindsight bias. See Block et al., supra note 118, at
12-18 (discussing rationales for the business judgment rule).
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the market, but the market failed. The court thus held the directors of
Trans Union responsible for fluctuations in interest rates. Van
Gorkom not only sold Trans Union just before its cash flows
plummeted, he also protected his chosen deal with one of the best
deal protection devices available: skyrocketing interest rates. He
could not have planned either. That is why the Smith decision
rankles: fundamentally, the court blamed the board for interest rates.
In spite of this error, the Smith court sketches a sensible approach
to the failure of mid-stream constraints in the last period. First, the
court recognized that the Trans Union management team faced last
period incentives. Second, because mid-stream constraints do not
apply to check the decision-making of management in the last period,
the court understood that it could not apply ordinary business
judgment rule deference. It therefore sought a procedural mechanism
to constrain the management team's potentially self-interested or selfserving decision-making. The best such mechanism would have been
the market for corporate control-that is, a valid market test. Failing
that, the court sought other procedural mechanisms, such as
investment banker fairness opinions.
Seen in this way, the Smith decision does not, as is sometimes
suggested,26 mandate any particular procedure.2 69 Rather, Smith
merely stands for the proposition that there must be some check on
the behavior of the management team in the last period. Because no
such check in fact existed in the Trans Union/Marmon Group merger,
the court over-rode the board's decision-making authority. It was a
mistake of the Smith court to hold the Trans Union directors
responsible for the failure of a market test that was no fault of their
own. But it was the virtue of the Smith court to recognize the last
period problem in the context of a negotiated acquisition and to
recognize the potential role of the market for corporate control in
constraining management in spite of their last period incentives. The
opinion thus sketched the contours of an approach to the last period
problem that has been followed by the Chancery Court in its recent
deal protection decisions.

268. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437, 1453-54 (1985) (arguing that procedures mandated by the
Smith decision constitute a "tax" on control transactions).
269. Indeed, empirical analysis has shown that the decision did not lead to a
marked increase in fairness opinions, as is often supposed. See Helen M. Bowers,
Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of
Target Firms' Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567, 577 (2002) (finding
that the initial surge, in the year following Smith, in the use of fairness opinions has
not been sustained: "overall, the average number of target firms utilizing fairness
opinions post-Van Gorkom (58%) is essentially the same as the percentage pre-Van
Gorkom (57%)").
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VI. THE CHANCERY COURT'S DECISIONS: DEAL PROTECTIONS IN
THE LAST PERIOD OF PLAY

The riddle of the Chancery Court's deal protection decisions may
now be solved. Seen in light of the last period problem, the decisions
are consistent with each other and present a coherent approach to
deal protection provisions.
The last period problem forms the basis of the Chancery Court's
approach. In the last period of play, such as a merger, an actor's
incentives to cooperate and behave in good faith predictably break
down. The absence of mid-stream constraints exposes shareholders to
the risk of exploitation through their management team's self-interest
and self-serving biases. Ordinarily, merger decisions would be
constrained by the market for corporate control, as one good bid may
lead to another, but deal protection provisions disable the constraint
of the control market. Succinctly stated: deal protection provisions
are troubling precisely because they permit management to insulate
its last period decisions from the constraint of the market for
corporate control.
Each of the Chancery Court's four recent deal protection decisions
involves the last period problem. An acquisition is present in each
case, thus throwing the management team of the target into its last
period. In addition, several of the cases took place against a dire
financial background. In ACE, Capital Re had reported poor
financial results for two quarters, was in the midst of a "capital
crunch," and was faced with a second Moody's downgrade of its
creditworthiness, which threatened seriously to affect earnings.27
Similarly, IXC had suffered bad financial results, causing "erosion in
the company's stock price and concern within the IXC board about
' In response, each of these companies
the company's management."271
launched a search for merger partners, effectively serving notice to
the management team that it was in its last period of play.
To say that each of these companies faced last period incentives is
not to say that all (or any) of their management teams actually
defected from the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. In fact, the procedural posture of most of the deal
protection cases points in the other direction. In ACE, for example,
the Capital Re board wanted to negotiate with another bidder, but
ACE sued to enforce the no-talk provision of the contract and enjoin
Capital Re from talking. It is not easy to tell a story about the target
management team serving its own interests under these
circumstances. A self-interested management team will not agree to a
deal in the first place, one might assume, unless the deal favors their
270. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97 (Del. Ch. 1999).
271. See In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. Nos. 17324, 17334,
1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
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selfish interests. Once that deal has been agreed, the management
team is unlikely to abandon it, as the Capital Re board did, the
moment a higher bid comes along. Still, it is not impossible to tell a
story about self-interest even under these circumstances. After all,
the second deal may be even more favorable to management than the
first, providing management with a clear self-serving motivation to get
out of their initial agreement.2 7 2 Thus, it turns out that telling whether
a management team's actions are selfishly motivated is as difficult as
telling, from the ex ante perspective, whether a given business decision
will be wise or foolish.
Courts can avoid opening the question of whether a management
team has behaved selfishly, just as they can avoid questioning the
wisdom of business decisions, by focusing on structural concerns.
Where the decision-making of management teams is entirely
unchecked by the constraints of markets or norms, as is often the case
in the last period, courts must intervene to ensure that their decisions
are made in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
If, however,
the management team's decision-making remains
constrained by markets or norms, courts can apply business judgment
rule deference and stay out of the hard questions. The court in ACE
thus avoided the question of the motivation of Capital Re's executives
and examined instead the deal protection provisions in the merger
agreement. Because the agreement contained strong deal protections
with no additional constraint on the decision-making of the
management team, it signaled that the company had been in an
unconstrained last period problem. The recognition of this structural
problem caused the court to invalidate the deal protections.
In focusing on the structural concern addressed by the court, it is
important to emphasize what the court did not do. The court did not
intercede to deem either of the two competing deals to be superior,
nor did the court second-guess any of the other last period business
decisions made by management. Instead, recognizing the structural
dilemma of an unconstrained last period, the court simply declined to
apply business judgment rule deference to the company's inclusion of
strong deal protections in its merger agreement, refusing to enforce
272. There is some reason to believe that ACE held out the promise of not
changing Capital Re's management structure as a means of sweetening its bid. After
the merger was announced, ACE CEO Brian Duperreault stated that Capital Re
would provide ACE with "a well-developed infrastructure and a highly skilled
management team," suggesting that a large scale restructuring of target management
was not planned. Dan Lonkevich, ACE Ltd. To Acquire Capital Re for Stock, Nat'l
Underwriter Prop. & Casualty-Risk & Benefits Mgmt., May 31, 1999. And after
closing, Mr. Duperreault made similar statements. See Janina Clark, ACE Plays the
Winning Card for Capital Re, Reinsurance Mag., Dec. 1, 1999, at 1 ("Brian
Duperreault, chief executive of Ace, said that he plans to operate Capital Re as a
stand-alone unit of the Ace Group and has no plans at present for any management
changes at the reinsurer.").
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the no-talk provision that prevented the company from negotiating
with other suitors. In other words, the court simply refused to allow
the parties to insulate their last period decisions from the structural
constraint of the market for corporate control.
That strong deal protections signal an unconstrained last period
problem does not mean that such provisions will always be invalid.
One way to solve an unconstrained last period problem is to introduce
constraints. If fairness opinions actually provided a disinterested
appraisal of the fairness of a transaction, management's ability to
provide a fairness opinion from a reputable investment bank might be
an adequate restraint on their ability to behave selfishly in the last
period. Because most commentators and courts are understandably
skeptical of the value of fairness opinions,273 the best means of
constraining the selfishness of management may be through a market
check.
A market check inserts constraints into what might otherwise be an
unconstrained last period decision by reintroducing the market for
corporate control. As discussed above, a competitive control market
prevents selfish managers from usurping, and foolish managers from
wasting, shareholder welfare.274 In the context of a friendly
acquisition, selfish managers may agree to a transaction paying
shareholders sub-optimal consideration provided that a portion of the
marginal difference between what the acquiror pays and what the
target is worth is deflected to themselves in the form of side payments,
such as future employment or consulting arrangements. Similarly,
foolish managers may agree to a transaction at a sub-optimal price
simply because they do not know what the company is really worth.
The insertion of the control market will constrain managers in each of
these situations.275 Most obviously, foolish managers will not be
deceived in the real value of the company since the solicitation of
other bids will either result in an overbid or incentivize the initial
bidder to offer a price close to its reservation value in hopes of
deterring other bidders.
A market check in the context of a friendly acquisition should
constrain selfish managers even though, based on the current change
of control paradigm, they are under no duty to accept unwanted
overbids. In the absence of Revlon duties to accept the highest price
offered for the target's shares, the control market may seem to
provide little or no constraint on the part of selfish managers
273. See supra note 236.
274. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
275. Following the numerical example introduced above, supra text accompanying
note 160, members of the target management team will be unable to support a bid at
$80 rather than $100 and appropriate the additional $20 for themselves since the
potential presence of other bidders will force the buyer to bid closer to the full $100
value in order to guarantee a successful acquisition.
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determined to refuse all bids except the one that serves their selfish
interests. However, the application of a market test in this context
provides at least two kinds of constraints. First, a market challenge to
management's preferred deal exposes management's selfishness to
board scrutiny. Second, solicitation of interest from the control
market increases the likelihood that an intervening bid will arise
causing shareholders to reject the selfish transaction favored by
management.
It is unlikely that every member of the board of directors and every
member of the management team is in cahoots to favor a sub-optimal
deal over the best deal for shareholders. It would be extremely
expensive for the acquiror to bribe every member of the board and
management with side payments. Less cynically, at least some
members of the board of directors are likely to take seriously their
charge to promote shareholder welfare. If not every member of the
board or management team is in cahoots to favor a sub-optimal bid, it
may be possible to win disinterested directors' support for a suboptimal bid only insofar as they do not know that a particular bid is in
fact sub-optimal. Selfish managers may be able to spin a convincing
story about how their particular deal has amazing synergies for
shareholders that are truly unique and unlikely to be matched by any
other company. Such stories may be persuasive to disinterested
managers and board members as long as they are not confronted with
any other bids. But the moment a premium bid arises, there will be
pressure on selfish managers to explain themselves to their
disinterested colleagues. They may argue that their deal creates even
greater value than the competing bid, but their colleagues are likely to
do the math and, if the competing bid offers a significant premium on
the favored deal, demand a truly compelling account of the supposed
synergies. In other words, the presence of competing bids exposes the
"selfishness discount" of management's favored bid. Selfish managers
may be able to explain away this discount to their disinterested
colleagues, and they may be assisted in this endeavor by the cognitive
biases inducing their colleagues to believe them, but plainly exposing
the magnitude of the discount will put pressure on their story.
Disinterested directors who prefer to think of themselves as loyal
shareholder representatives rather than as shills or dupes of their
selfish colleagues are likely to insist that the final deal price approach
the optimal price for the target company, even though there is no
legal rule requiring a sale at the best price, as there is in the Revlon
context.
Shareholders present the second line of defense against a selfish
deal. The activation of the market for corporate control, even though
management is not required to accept unwanted overbids, awakens
the constraining influence that shareholders can exert on the selfish
decision-making of management. By engaging in a market test, the
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target encourages other bidders to arise. If a premium bidder arises
during the market test period, target managers may still reject it and
go forward with the favored transaction. In the merger agreement
with the preferred acquiror, managers may then include deal
protection provisions, but in this context the spurned premium bidder
is likely to rise again notwithstanding the terms of the merger
agreement. As noted at the beginning of this article, the primary
purpose of deal protection provisions is to discourage intervening bids
by creating transaction costs and information asymmetries. 7 6 Where
a spurned bidder has already decided that the target is worth more
than the value reflected in the merger agreement, however, it is not
likely to be troubled by information asymmetries and, as long as the
transaction costs are within the customary range,277 may announce its
offer for the company notwithstanding the deal protections.
Although target management is under no duty to accept this offer,
target shareholders still get to vote. Given the choice between
approving the sub-optimal deal and rejecting the sub-optimal deal in
the hope that management will pursue the higher offer after its
favored deal has fallen through, they are likely to reject the suboptimal deal.
In this way, the reinsertion of the market for corporate control will
constrain the last period decision-making of management in spite of
the fact that managers are under no Revlon duties to accept offers
arising from that market. The exposure of management's transaction,
whether pre-signing or post-signing, to the market for corporate
control, should reasonably assure boards and shareholders that no
significantly better deal was, in fact, available. Once this assurance is
made, strong deal protections become palatable. Deal protection
provisions will still insulate the agreement from the market for
corporate control, but if the market for corporate control was
operational prior to the execution of the agreement, then a sufficient
constraint may have existed ex ante to make the absence of postsigning constraints irrelevant. Pre-signing discussions with potential
bidders, a "pre-signing market check," should be a sufficient basis for
approving strong deal protection provisions, even no-talks without a
fiduciary out. A post-signing solicitation of interest, a "post-signing
market check," may be inconsistent with strict no-talk and no-shop
provisions, since the market check requires talking, 278 but may provide
an appropriate constraint in agreeing to other kinds of deal
protections, including termination fees and option agreements. Such
details aside, the conceptual point is simple: the reintroduction of the
276. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14.
277. See supra note 11 (noting that 3-4% of deal value is a commonly accepted
termination fee).
278. No-talk and no-shop provisions that explicitly carve out a post-signing
canvassing of the market may be consistent with a post-signing market check.
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control market prevents management from defecting in its last period
decisions.279

Where there has been a market check, and thus a reinsertion of the
constraining influence of the market for corporate control, the court
can apply business judgment deference to all decisions of the

management team, including the decision to agree to deal protections
in the merger agreement. The market check introduces constraints
into what would otherwise be an unconstrained last period decision.

The presence of a market check is thus the key distinguishing feature
between Phelps Dodge and ACE, on the one hand, and IXC and
Bartlett, on the other.2"" In neither Phelps Dodge nor ACE had the
management team engaged in any kind of market check to test the
deal it made in the initial merger agreement,2"' and in each of those
cases management further insulated the untested deal from the
market for corporate control with strong deal protections. The
combination of strong deal protections and no market test signaled an
unconstrained last period problem, causing the court to invalidate the
deal protections.
By contrast, in both IXC and Bartlett, the target company had
engaged in a form of market test. In JXC, the board, through its
investment banker, had canvassed the universe of potential bidders to
such an extent that the list of companies consulted read like "a who's
'
who of telecommunications players."282
Similarly, in Bartlett, "Medco,
with the experience and assistance of [its investment bankers],
aggressively sought out suitors."2 3 Because each of these companies
had engaged in a process that reintegrated the market for corporate
control into what otherwise would have been unchecked last period
decisions, the court could apply business judgment deference to the
279. See supra note 275.
280. See Michael A. Stanchfield, Fiduciary Duties in Negotiated Acquisitions:
Questioning the Legal Requirementfor "Outs," 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 2261 (2001).
The cases turn on an analysis of the directors' conduct and diligence in the
process of investigating the acquisitions market and negotiating the merger
agreement.... A common theme runs through the cases that have found
violations of this duty of care: the target board of directors' lack of
information on the market for control of the corporation.
Id. at 2282.
281. In ACE, Vice Chancellor Strine states that Capital Re had been "exploring a
possible business combination or capital infusion" for more than a year but does not
elucidate the process through which this exploration took place. ACE, Ltd. v. Capital
Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97 (Del. Ch. 1999). Was it entirely internal, involving
spreadsheets and management estimates? Or did solicitations take place? In any
case, the court clearly does not regard this exploratory process as a valid market
check.
282. In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. Nos. 17324, 17334,1999
Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (listing AT&T, MCI WorldCom,
Teleglobe, Bell Atlantic, Cable & Wireless, Bell South, IDT, RSL, GTS, and Qwest
as companies with which IXC had communicated regarding a potential deal).
283. Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *16
(Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
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agreed-upon deal protections.
The Chancery Court's approach to the problem of deal protections
in the last period of play is thus a further development of the
Delaware Supreme Court's approach to the problem in Smith.
Neither court has mandated a particular procedure for dealing with
the collapse of mid-stream incentives in the last period. Whether that
procedure involves a fairness opinion or a market check or some
other means of introducing a constraint on the management team is
irrelevant. Rather, each court insists on a showing that the structural
problem of last period incentives has been solved by the target
company's process in deciding upon the deal. Thus, as a practical
matter, corporate counselors need not advise their clients that they
must shop every friendly deal any more than they needed to advise
their clients, post-Smith, that every board decision required a fairness
opinion. However, deal protection provisions are troubling precisely
because they eliminate the last period constraint of the control
market, and the best and easiest way to reinsert that constraint is
through a market check. If a company conducts a valid market check,
then even the strongest deal protections should receive business
judgment rule deference.2" 4 If a company does not conduct a valid
market test, corporate counsel will have to exercise some creativity in
devising a procedural check that will persuade a court that the board
did not make its decision in an unconstrained last period of play.
Otherwise, the court will invalidate the deal protections.
Finally, the Chancery Court's last period analysis of deal protection
provisions does not suggest that a company is putting itself in play by
agreeing to a friendly merger. Neither assessing the interest of other
bidders prior to agreeing to deal protection provisions nor entering
into a more weakly protected merger agreement forces a target to
accept unwanted offers, either during the solicitation period or during
the period between signing and closing. Of course, if an unwanted
offer does arise and represents a significant premium over the
intended deal, the target's shareholders may reject the initial deal."'
The shareholders, however, have no power to force the target to
accept the competing bid, and there is no reason to believe, assuming
that it has the usual anti-takeover provisions in place, that the target
could not remain independent after the initial deal fell apart. For
284. Interestingly, the safe harbor of a market check may provide negotiating
leverage to a target who prefers not to include deal protection provisions in the
merger agreement. Essentially, the target can offer to include the provision but only
if the buyer agrees to allow a market check, which the buyer may seek to avoid since
a market check exposes it to the risk that others will bid the price up. The buyer who
has not emerged as a result of a solicitation process will thus be in the position of
choosing between a market check and a contestable merger agreement.
285. This is true, of course, whether or not the initial deal is protected in the
merger agreement. As discussed above, supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text, the
real value of deal protection provisions is to make intervening bids less likely.
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example, if a target company felt that it could achieve desired
"synergies" only with the chosen partner and not with an intervening
bidder, it would not be forced to deal with the intervening bidder after
its shareholders vetoed the deal with the chosen partner. It could,
instead, "just say no" to the intervening bidder and seek to explore
other strategic options with the chosen partner or, alternately,
continue on exactly the same path it had been on prior to entering
negotiations with its chosen partner." 6
CONCLUSION

This article has applied insights drawn from game theory and
cognitive psychology to answer whether and when target companies
may make binding promises to their intended suitors not to consider
Target companies may agree to deal protection
other offers.
provisions when they are not in the midst of an unconstrained last
period problem. Because mergers throw the target's management
team into a last period situation, the target must introduce some form
of procedural constraint, such as a market check, as a prerequisite to
protecting its deal. Having introduced such a constraint into its
management team's last period decision-making, the target company
should be free to agree to strong deal protection provisions.
The Chancery Court's deal protection decisions follow this rule.
Bartlett and IXC provide examples of last period problems that were
checked by the constraint of a market test, thus validating the merger
agreements' deal protections, while Phelps Dodge and ACE provide
examples of uncontested, unchecked last period problems, requiring
an invalidation of deal protections. The theoretical perspective of the
last period problem thus brings internal consistency to the Chancery
Court's deal protection quartet. Moreover, far from rewriting the law
on mergers and acquisitions, these decisions reawaken an aspect of
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith, providing a sound
theoretical basis for the Delaware Supreme Court's eventual
consideration of the issue as well as pragmatic guidance for dealmakers. Companies can agree to strong deal protections provided
that they have conducted a market check or engaged in some other
procedural mechanism to control unconstrained last period incentives.

286. See Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del.
1995) (endorsing the ability of a board to remain independent after receiving and
rejecting a takeover offer). Last period analysis supports the decision of target
companies to "just say no" to the bids of would-be acquirors, to leave their antitakeover provisions in place, and to remain independent. Although an in-depth
analysis of the takeover market from the perspective of the last period problem is
outside of the scope of this article, it would appear that a target's decision does not
give rise to an unchecked last period problem because in continuing its business, the
company will remain sensitive to the mid-stream constraints of markets and norms.

